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  INTRODUCTION   
How we categorize our rules helps to shape what they be-
come. Lawmakers know their subjects, of course, and they as-
pire to formulate rules on the merits; no one could fairly brand 
these craftsmen as simple-minded. Nevertheless, they remain 
conspicuously symbol-minded. Like laypersons—only more so—
lawmakers rely on abstract symbols to streamline their think-
ing.1 By gathering doctrines under a single categorical umbrel-
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Tate, and auditors at faculty colloquia at Arizona State University College of 
Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law, and the University of Tulsa 
College of Law for helpful comments. Copyright © 2011 by Adam J. Hirsch. 
 1. With his usual acuity, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. recognized this ten-
dency and warned against overreliance on symbols with his aphorism that 
“[w]e must think things not words, or at least we must constantly translate 
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la, we connect them symbolically and encourage lawmakers to 
harmonize law within the defined category. Likewise, by dis-
tinguishing categories and decorating them with different sym-
bols, we discourage comparative analysis, and thereby obscure 
coincidences of policy that nonetheless link the isolated doc-
trines structurally. Pointless inconsistencies of law often follow. 
Although it may not steer rules along predetermined paths, le-
gal taxonomy guides lawmakers to scout in given directions for 
relevant symmetries and analogies. It serves, in other words, as 
a sort of compass, which—depending on how well it is cali-
brated—can send lawmakers wandering down blind alleys or 
lead them straight to the heart of things.2 
The prevailing canon categorizes gratuitous transfers as a 
branch of property law—“family property law,” as the American 
Law Institute would have it.3 Accordingly, the doctrines of gifts 
and wills have occupied a volume of the second, and now of the 
third, Restatement of Property.4 Considered structurally, 
though, the essential doctrines of property delineate rights of 
exclusivity, of an owner against all others—or, as legal histo-
rians are wont to say, matters of meum and tuum. By contrast, 
the doctrines of gifts and wills are secondary: presupposing 
that an exclusive right to property exists, these doctrines ad-
dress owners’ subsidiary rights to move their property into oth-
er hands—matters involving economic interrelations between 
persons. 
Thus conceptualized, doctrines of gifts and wills appear to 
resemble secondary doctrines governing other sorts of voluntary 
movements of property—to wit, exchanges, which fall under the 
 
our words into the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and 
the true.” Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. 
L. REV. 443, 460 (1899).  
 2. For a fuller discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsist-
ency, 57 OHIO ST. L. REV. 1057, 1135–62 (1996); see also ANTHONY G. 
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 19–53 (2000) (weighing 
the virtues and vices of categorization); Emily Sherwin, Legal Taxonomy, 15 
LEGAL THEORY 25, 39–43 (2009) (assessing the functions of legal categorization). 
 3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS intro. (2003). 
 4. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS (1983); 
see also, e.g., 1 WILLIAM H. PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 1.1, at 1 (Jeff-
rey A. Schoenblum ed., rev. ed. 2003 & Supp. 2009) (“The law of wills . . . is 
clearly a part of the law of property.”); Peter Birks, Introduction to ENGLISH 
PRIVATE LAW ix, xxxv–xli (Peter Birks ed., 2000) (classifying wills as a subcat-
egory of the law of property, and contracts as a subcategory of the law of obli-
gations). This categorical framework traces back to Roman law, if not earlier. 
THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 65, 111, 198 (J.A.C. Thomas ed., 1975). 
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rubric of contract law. The two may feature a closer connection 
than even this correspondence would suggest. Whereas some 
benefactors may make gifts and bequests that are wholly al-
truistic and unilateral, gratuitous transfers frequently involve 
implicit elements of exchange, albeit ones not adorned with the 
symbol “consideration” by the legal system. Scholars from a 
range of disciplines have explored the phenomenon.5 And even 
though, for want of a symbol, courts decline to enforce such 
quasi-exchanges as obligations, they may remain self-enforcing 
via the unstated threat to terminate the parties’ relationship—
a sanction also lurking in the background of contractual ex-
change.6 In reality, then, the distinction between contracts and 
gratuities is a blurry one. Each occasions productive activity, 
and although gratuities fuel a more shrouded, gray economy, 
 
 5. The literature on this subject is as scattered as it is vast. For a classic 
economic discussion, see KENNETH E. BOULDING, THE ECONOMY OF LOVE AND 
FEAR (1973). For more recent discussions, see, for example, THE ECONOMICS 
OF RECIPROCITY, GIVING AND ALTRUISM (L.-A. Gérard-Varet et al. eds., 2000); 
1 & 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY 
(Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean M. Ythier eds., 2006); ODED STARK, ALTRUISM 
AND BEYOND (1995); Avner Offer, Between the Gift and the Market: The Econ-
omy of Regard, 50 ECON. HIST. REV. 450 passim (1997). For field studies, see 
Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 315, 339–41 (2009); Armin Falk, Note, Gift Exchange in the 
Field, 75 ECONOMETRICA 1501 passim (2007). For an anthropological discus-
sion, see, for example, MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT (W.D. Hall trans., 1990). For 
a sociological discussion, see, for example, DAVID CHEAL, THE GIFT ECONOMY 
(1988). For a historical discussion, see, for example, ILANA KRAUSMAN BEN-
AMOS, THE CULTURE OF GIVING: INFORMAL SUPPORT AND GIFT EXCHANGE IN 
EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (2008). For a philosophical discussion, see, for ex-
ample, DAVID J. OWENS, Obligation and Involvement, in SHAPING THE 
NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE (forthcoming 2012). For a psychological discussion, 
see, for example, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE (Robert A. Emmons & Mi-
chael E. McCullough eds., 2004). For a study grounded in behavioral biology, 
see, for example, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for So-
cial Exchange, in THE ADAPTED MIND 163 passim (Jerome H. Barkow et al. 
eds., 1992). For a study grounded in population genetics, see, for example, Sam-
uel Bowles, Did Warfare Among Ancestral Hunter-Gatherers Affect the Evolu-
tion of Human Social Behaviors?, 324 SCIENCE, June 5, 2009, at 1293 passim. 
For neuroeconomic research, see, for example, James K. Rilling & Alan G. 
Sanfrey, The Neuroscience of Social Decision-Making, 62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 
23, 26–28 (2011). For an interdisciplinary anthology, see THE QUESTION OF 
THE GIFT (Mark Osteen ed., 2002). For additional references, see Adam J. 
Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. 
L.J. 1, 9 n.30 (1992).  
 6. Benjamin Klein, The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing 
Relationships, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 59 passim (Eric Brousseau & 
Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 2002). 
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that economy nevertheless rivals the traditional market in its 
social significance.7 
Nor do the linkages end there. Just as gratuities may mask 
quasi-exchanges, contracts may mask quasi-subsidies, where 
bargains are knowingly disproportionate.8 The two economies, 
in short, can converge, and this convergence may be more than 
tacit. Some transfers formally combine exchange with gratuity. 
These include third-party beneficiary contracts, transfers in 
trust to a compensated third-party trustee, and, in a testamen-
tary context, contracts to make wills, contracts with pay-on-
death designations, the rare but interesting “bequest” of a pe-
riod of employment9―plus some other compounds whose less 
conspicuous attributes need clarifying.10 
The foundational claim of this Article is that associating 
the law of gratuities with the law of contracts, gathered within 
a reconfigured category of transfers, would pay conceptual divi-
dends and, at the end of the day, promote public policy.11 This 
 
 7. Economic studies have found that a large fraction (possibly in the 
range of eighty percent) of household wealth in the United States traces to 
gifts and inheritances, as opposed to participation in the labor economy. Wil-
liam G. Gale & John K. Scholz, Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumula-
tion of Wealth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145, 146–47, 156–57 (1994) (citing to earlier 
studies); Pierre Pestieau, The Role of Gift and Estate Transfers in the United 
States and in Europe, in DEATH AND DOLLARS 64, 71–74 (Alicia H. Munnell & 
Annika Sundén eds., 2003) (citing to earlier studies). For a recent study of the 
relative importance of exchange and altruism in prompting these transfers, 
both in the context of gifts and of bequests, see Edward C. Norton & Courtney 
H. Van Houtven, Inter Vivos Transfers and Exchange, 73 S. ECON. J. 157 pas-
sim (2006) (citing to earlier conflicting studies, and finding evidence of ex-
change as inducing gifts but not bequests). For references to additional rele-
vant studies, see infra note 212. 
 8. For a recognition of this social reality and its implications for the con-
sideration requirement in contract law, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 71 & cmt. c, 79 & cmt. d (1981). The phenomenon of “altruistic” 
contracts is sufficiently familiar that, in connection with employment, we have 
a nontechnical word to describe them—we call these labor agreements sine-
cures. But contracts can blend elements of gift and exchange. For discussions, 
see George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 
543 passim (1982); Offer, supra note 5, at 472; Florian Englmaier & Steve Leid-
er, Gift Exchange in the Lab—It Is Not (Only) How Much You Give . . . , at 1 
(2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546364. 
 9. See, e.g., D’Arcangelo v. D’Arcangelo, 43 A.2d 169, 170–71 (N.J. Ch. 
1945) (holding such an instruction not to comprise a legacy but nevertheless to 
be enforceable for a testator’s wholly owned business); Hughes v. Hiscox, 174 
N.Y.S. 564, 565–69 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (same).  
 10. See infra text following note 53 and text accompanying note 170. 
 11. Of course, we can continue to conceptualize property as a metacate-
gory incorporating transfers of both sorts as sources or forms of wealth. See 
Birks, supra note 4, at xlii (categorizing wills within the law of property and 
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is not to say that all distinctions of doctrine between gratuities 
and contracts ought to be obliterated. Plainly, many are justi-
fied,12 just as particular distinctions between gifts and wills 
within gratuitous transfers law are justified, and particular 
distinctions between bargains for goods and for services within 
contract law are justified. The categories we choose to set apart 
need not be pristine to be useful. Simply by identifying gratui-
ties and contracts as kindred problems, we call attention to 
doctrinal asymmetries that have taken shape—and then press 
lawmakers either to smooth out those asymmetries or to vindi-
cate them, in the face of provisional skepticism. 
To be sure, the categorical relation highlighted in this Ar-
ticle has not escaped all notice. As early as the seventeenth 
century, legal thinkers asserted that, in various doctrinal con-
texts, “‘a valid argument runs from contracts to last wills, and 
vice-versa.’”13 Commentators have continued to make the point 
now and again.14 Nevertheless, the relation has never gone 
 
contracts within the law of obligations but accepting that “[a]t the highest lev-
el of generality” both “arise from a manifestation of the consent of some gran-
tor . . . . Manifestations of consent include contracts, conveyances, and wills.”). 
See generally Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1 (2009). 
 12. For a defense of one such doctrinal distinction that nevertheless draws 
attention to the categorical relation, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of 
Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821 passim (1997). 
 13. R.H. Helmholz, The Origins of Holographic Wills in English Law, 15 
J. LEGAL HIST. 97, 102 (1994) (quoting English formulary manuscript c. 1620, 
translated from the Latin text).  
 14. In the eighteenth century, as organized by Blackstone, “contract and 
succession are both dealt with as means by which the title to property gets 
transferred. There is no doubt that freedom of contract and freedom of testa-
tion were then, and later, closely connected ideas.” P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND 
FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 89 (1979). In the nineteenth century, Jeremy 
Bentham identified wills as a subcategory of contracts. JEREMY BENTHAM, Ra-
tionale of Judicial Evidence, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 189, 530 
(John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) (1827). In the twentieth century, 
H.L.A. Hart grouped the law of wills with the law of contracts as coequal bod-
ies of “power-conferring rules,” allowing individuals “to vary their initial posi-
tions under the primary rules,” which Hart rated as “one of the great contribu-
tions of law to social life.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 28, 94 (1961). 
Still more recently, in the course of elaborating the conventional scheme of 
classification, the American Law Institute paused to acknowledge the relation: 
“This part of the Restatement . . . excludes . . . commercial transactions in 
property, even though some of the property problems dealt with herein may 
arise in a commercial context as well as in a donative one.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS intro. (1983); see also, e.g., JOSEPH 
M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 3.2(b), at 109 (6th ed. 
2009) (observing that, with regard to the formal requirements for contractual 
and testamentary transfers, “[t]he Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Wills 
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through the rigors of systematic inquiry. Formal reclassifica-
tion of wills and contracts as branches of transfers law within 
codes and Restatements would function to prompt such inquiry. 
In earlier work, I cross-examined default rule principles 
within the law of wills and contracts, concluding that the 
theory applicable to contractual defaults readily carries over to 
inheritance defaults and should serve as a model for both.15 
The present Article broadens the comparison to mandatory 
rules—more exactly, mandatory substantive rules,16 setting 
limits on freedom of testation and freedom of contract, respec-
tively. I shall leave for another day mandatory limits on a 
transferor’s right to create any will or contract on account of 
the transferor’s state of mind, embodied in structurally corre-
sponding doctrines of testamentary and contractual capacity. 
Likewise, the problem of encroachment by third parties upon 
the exercise of testamentary or contractual freedom, addressed 
by doctrines of fraud, duress, undue influence, and tortious in-
terference—again, each with a parallel in the law of wills and 
the law of contracts—merits separate treatment. More than 
enough remains to occupy us for awhile.  
Part I lays a theoretical foundation by comparing the justi-
fications for freedom of contract, together with rationales for 
limiting it, with freedom of testation and its limits. The sec-
tions following proceed to measure and reassess from a con-
tracts perspective the sphere of freedom of testation in greater 
depth. Part II inspects prevailing restrictions on conditional 
bequests. Part III takes up restrictions applicable even to un-
conditional bequests. Part IV explores the polar-opposite topic 
 
embody similar considerations”). An analogous connection has been drawn be-
tween the laws of trusts and contracts, although it remains a matter of contro-
versy. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 
YALE L.J. 625 passim (1995); see also David Horton, Unconscionability in the 
Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675 passim (2009) (arguing that trust 
law should absorb the unconscionability doctrine from contract law); cf. Henry 
Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 469–72 (1998); Robert H. 
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 627–
34 (2004); Joshua C. Tate, Should Charitable Trust Enforcement Rights Be As-
signable?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045, 1056–67 (2010).  
 15. Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in 
Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031 passim (2004) [hereinafter 
Hirsch, Default Rules]. For an extension of this analysis, see Adam J. Hirsch, 
Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 
609, 633–35, 659–63 (2009) [hereinafter Hirsch, Obsolescence].  
 16. For a discussion of mandatory procedural rules for formalizing wills in 
comparison to contracts, see Hirsch, supra note 2, at 1078–82. 
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of compulsory bequests. Part V turns finally to the temporal 
dimension of testation—that is, the power of a testator to 
project his or her estate-planning edicts into the future. 
I.  THEORETICAL PROLOGUE   
“[L]iberty is not a value but the ground of value.” 
—W.H. Auden17 
 
Many thinkers (not least Patrick Henry) would take issue 
with Auden’s dictum. We may prize economic autonomy along 
with other liberties for their own sake.18 Freedom of contract 
and of gift-giving fit snugly within a libertarian ethic, but free-
dom of testation, narrowly defined, carries that ethic into new 
existential territory: Must we respect persons’ autonomy em-
bodied in a last will, even after they have become disembodied? 
Philosophers perennially debate the matter,19 and we shall 
have to leave it there. Yet, as Auden suggests, the problem does 
not end there; we can identify virtues in liberty without em-
bracing libertarianism. Our analysis can focus, alternatively, 
on utilitarian concerns. Whether or not we deem it a good per 
se, economic autonomy facilitates our obtaining other goods. 
Freedom of contract, coupled with legal mechanisms of 
contract enforcement, create the conditions under which mar-
kets proliferate. Voluntary trade is utility-enhancing for both 
parties to a transaction, channeling items of property to the 
 
 17. W.H. Auden, Introduction to HENRY JAMES, THE AMERICAN SCENE, at 
xviii (W.H. Auden ed., 1946) (1907). 
 18. See In re Wilkins’ Estate, 211 N.W. 652, 653–54 (Wis. 1927) (exalting 
freedom of testation as a “sacred right”); Printing & Numerical Registering Co. 
v. Sampson, [1875] L.R.Eq. 462 at 465 (Eng.) (“Contracts when entered into 
freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred.”); see also, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE 2 (1981) (lauding freedom of contract as an expression 
of “liberal individualism”). For a broader discussion distinguishing the “oppor-
tunity” and “process” components of freedom, see AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY 
AND FREEDOM 506–27, 583–695 (2002). 
 19. For a summary, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 7 & n.23. For 
broader discussions, see DANIEL SPERLING, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL 
AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES (2008); Kirsten R. Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 
37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763 passim (2009). For a literary observation of the co-
nundrum, see CHARLES DICKENS, OUR MUTUAL FRIEND 4–5 (New York, Mac-
millan & Co. 1895) (1865) (“What world does a dead man belong to? T’other 
world. What world does money belong to? This world. Can a corpse own it, 
want it, spend it, claim it, miss it?”). 
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party who values them more.20 And these gains from trade are 
only the beginning, since the opportunity for trade facilitates 
the division of labor, thereby unlocking productive energies and 
efficiencies that expand the sum of tradable property availa-
ble—hence contributing not merely to a Pareto optimal alloca-
tion of resources, but to plenty.21 
Analogous benefits flow from freedom of testation. Gratui-
tous transfers obviously benefit recipients, but they simulta-
neously gratify a benefactor, whose happiness depends on 
theirs (given an interdependent utility function, in the icy jar-
gon of economics)—a Pareto optimal gain from transfer, as op-
posed to trade.22 Although benefactors cannot share in a benefi-
ciary’s utility from an inheritance at the time of its receipt, 
they can envision it, and derive present utility from its antici-
pation.23 Giving persons the right to make a will therefore en-
courages them to produce and to save more wealth,24 again 
adding to the sum of capital stock.25 Freedom of testation can 
 
 20. E.g., Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner, Introduction: Eco-
nomic Theory and Contract Law, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1, 1–4 
(Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Posner eds., 1979).  
 21. E.g., Douglass C. North, Institutions and Economic Growth: An His-
torical Introduction, 17 WORLD DEV. 1319, 1319–21 (1989). For an early dis-
cussion, see 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 7–20 (Edwin Cannan 
ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776). For a judicial recognition, see Dia-
mond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421–22 (N.Y. 1887) (“It is an encour-
agement to industry and to enterprise in building up a trade, that a man shall 
be allowed to sell the good-will of the business and the fruits of his industry 
upon the best terms he can obtain.”). For an argument that the division of la-
bor (and, by extension, the free trade permitting that division) played a part in 
our survival as a species, see Richard D. Horan et al., How Trade Saved Hu-
manity from Biological Exclusion: An Economic Theory of Neanderthal Extinc-
tion, 58 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 passim (2005). 
 22. Theodore C. Bergstrom, A Survey of Theories of the Family, in 1A 
HANDBOOK OF POPULATION AND FAMILY ECONOMICS 21, 59–62 (Mark R. Ro-
senzweig & Oded Stark eds., 1997). 
 23. Jon Elster & George Loewenstein, Utility from Memory and Anticipa-
tion, in CHOICE OVER TIME 213, 213–15, 223–28 (George Loewenstein & Jon 
Elster eds., 1992). 
 24. For a recent empirical analysis, see Wojciech Kopczuk & Joseph P. 
Lupton, To Leave or Not to Leave: The Distribution of Bequest Motives, 74 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 207 passim (2007) (finding that households with bequest motives 
spend significantly less on lifetime consumption). For references to earlier dis-
cussions, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 7–9. For judicial acknowledge-
ments, see Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28, 30 (Conn. C.P. 1966); Wogan v. 
Small, 11 Serg. & Rawle 141, 145 (Pa. 1824) (“[F]reedom of disposition by last 
will . . . is one of the greatest excitements to enterprise and industry.”).  
 25. Still, the marginal impact of interdependent utilities on productivity 
and saving is tempered by the benefactor’s simultaneous regard for self. GARY 
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 282, 284 (1976). 
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simultaneously give rise to a virtual market for reciprocal al-
truistic transfers, beneficiaries providing social services that 
benefactors value in implicit exchange for a share of their es-
tates.26 In theory, beneficiaries could offer those same services 
within a contract-based market, but cultural taboos inhibit ex-
plicit exchanges within families and other social networks.27 
What is more, the very offer of services for sale can alter their 
social nature, paradoxically reducing the utility of transferors, 
and also sometimes cheapening the services’ value to recip-
ients.28 In the language of economics, things given and things 
sold are imperfect substitutes. 
 
But cf. Louis Kaplow, Utility from Accumulation, NAT’L TAX ASSOC., PROC. 
102ND ANN. CONF. (forthcoming 2011) (suggesting that self-regard can en-
courage saving). This regard has figured in several popular works on inherit-
ance aimed at the “Me” generation. ELMER OTTE, INHERIT YOUR OWN MONEY 
(1978); STEPHEN M. POLLAN & MARK LEVINE, DIE BROKE (1998). For an early 
discussion, see DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 486–87 (P.H. 
Nidditch ed., Oxford Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739–1740) (observing that individu-
als embedded within families exhibit a mixture of altruism and selfishness). 
For a further psychological insight into saving behavior, see Wojciech Kopczuk 
& Joel Slemrod, Denial of Death and Economic Behavior, 5 ADVANCES 
THEORETICAL ECON., no. 1, 2005, available at http://www.bepress.com/bejte/ 
advances/vol5/iss1/art5. 
 26. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 9–11 (citing to prior discussions). For 
a further discussion, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The 
Meaning of the Fresh Start, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 211–14 (1994). For an early 
discussion recognizing both rationales, see BENTHAM, supra note 14, at 531 
(“In this way, value is created, as it were, out of nothing.”). For an early spoof 
of the phenomenon within popular culture, see BEN JONSON, VOLPONE (Alvin 
B. Kernan & Richard B. Young eds., Yale Univ. Press 1962) (first performed as 
a stage play in 1606). 
 27. For a historical discussion, see William I. Miller, Gift, Sale, Payment, 
Raid: Case Studies in the Negotiation and Classification of Exchange in Me-
dieval Iceland, 61 SPECULUM 18, 21–25, 42, 46–50 (1986). For economic and 
social interpretations, see Rachel E. Kranton, Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-
Sustaining System, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 830 passim (1996) (arguing that recip-
rocal altruism and exchange tend to be mutually exclusive and path-
dependent); Offer, supra note 5, at 454 (noting the preference against cash as 
a medium of inter vivos reciprocal altruism, which would make the transfer 
appear “too much like a wage”). Taboos against formal exchange are occasion-
ally explored, once again, within popular culture. In a disturbing scene in the 
feature film Carnal Knowledge, a mistress complains to her self-absorbed, 
emotionally distant paramour, played by Jack Nicholson (who else?), that, 
ensconced in his apartment, she has no life and no career. In an extended solil-
oquy, he angrily responds by offering to employ her—paying her fixed dollar 
amounts for each type and item of household service that she performs for him 
within the apartment. CARNAL KNOWLEDGE (AVCO Embassy Pictures 1971). 
 28. PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 112 (1964); 
STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 223–24 (2004) (“[P]art of the value of a 
gift lies in the fact that it is given as a gift . . . . The expression of [donative] 
intent is considered valuable in and of itself.”); RICHARD TITTMUS, THE GIFT 
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Of course, only the stoniest of hearts views an estate plan 
exclusively as a medium of exchange. And if the state does not 
intend to confiscate property upon the deaths of its owners, it 
must devolve according to some plan of distribution to survi-
vors. Assuming a family is tied together by bonds of affection, 
leaving estate plans to owners’ discretion exploits their knowl-
edge (and hence their comparative advantage as contrasted 
with legislators or courts) to devise a plan that enhances the 
family’s welfare.29 By analogy, what Dean Roscoe Pound called 
“contractual dirigism”30—a command economy in which the 
state orders industrial exchange—would squander the knowl-
edge that market signals provide and again lessen the welfare 
of society. 
As a historical matter, the laws of exchange have tended in 
the direction of expanding freedom and hence have evolved 
“from [s]tatus to [c]ontract,” in Sir Henry Maine’s celebrated 
phrase.31 We can discern an analogous trend from status-based 
rights of inheritance toward unfettered testation.32 It is easy to 
generalize today that “[t]he organizing principle of the Ameri-
can law of donative transfers is freedom of disposition.”33 Still 
and all, neither freedom of contract nor freedom of testation 
has ever become absolute under our law.34 Each has its limits, 
 
RELATIONSHIP 263–64 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., 1997); Offer, supra 
note 5, at 454. And vice versa: just as cultural taboos may require exchanges 
to be clothed as gifts, decorum sometimes demands that the benefactor dress 
up a gift as a contract. Miller, supra note 27, at 22. The social more against 
gifting typically arises in situations where an act of charity would cause the 
recipient to lose status. See BOULDING, supra note 5, at 26 . 
 29. Hirsch and Wang, supra note 5, at 12 (citing to prior discussions).  
 30. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 161–
63 (rev. ed. 1954) (borrowing the phrase from French jurists). 
 31. HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 172–74 (Frederick Pollock ed., J. Mur-
ray 10th ed. 1920) (1897). 
 32. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 284–
94, 435–37 (1990) (describing early legal currents); RAY D. MADOFF, 
IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW 5–11 (2010) (noting modern trends). For an exam-
ple of a limitation on freedom of testation that has become extinct, see Shirley 
N. Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the United States, 12 MISS. C. L. REV. 
407 passim (1992). But cf. infra note 281 (concerning trust law). 
 33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (2003). 
 34. See McKean v. Warburton, 919 So. 2d 341, 344 (Fla. 2005) (“It is an 
elementary principle that a person can dispose of his or her property by will as 
he or she pleases so long as that person’s intent is not contrary to any principle 
of law or public policy.” (emphasis added)). Likewise: “The power to contract is 
not unlimited. While, as a general rule, there is the utmost freedom of action 
in this regard, some restrictions are placed upon the right by legislation, by 
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in theory and in practice. As the foregoing pages have sug-
gested, rationales for granting freedom of contract and of testa-
tion roughly correspond. Do rationales for restricting freedom of 
contract and of testation also correspond? 
One justification for confining freedom of contract stems 
from its dependence on suitable conditions to ensure its proper 
exercise. When a market operates imperfectly, unfettered free-
dom of contract can lead to inefficiency. Thus, an agreement be-
tween two contractors might impose a cost on others that they 
would pay to avoid. Yet, third parties sometimes cannot bar-
gain with contractors due to coordination impediments or for 
other reasons. The market can sustain such an agreement, 
even if its spillover costs (also known as negative externalities, 
in the parlance of economics) exceed its benefits. Under these 
conditions, lawmakers preserve efficiency by restraining free-
dom of contract.35 Rules barring contracts to commit crimes 
represent an obvious example, and various other market regu-
lations also trace to this source. The classic (but not exclusive) 
justification for disallowing clauses in contracts for credit that 
waive the bankruptcy discharge is that such clauses would 
harm family members and burden the state’s welfare apparat-
us by weakening the incentives of hopelessly insolvent debtors 
to labor.36 
A second, more controversial, justification for limiting free-
dom of contract follows not from market failure, but (so to say) 
from personal failure. Lawmakers could anticipate that con-
 
public policy, and by the nature of things.” Sternaman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
62 N.E. 763, 764 (N.Y. 1902). “[C]ontractual freedom is . . . not fundamental to 
the notion of the contract . . . . Public order is . . . a constituent aspect thereof, 
as it specifies the conditions under which the law recognizes its binding force.” 
Jacques Ghestin, The Contract as Economic Trade, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
CONTRACTS, supra note 6, at 99, 105–06. For a recognition of limitations on 
both freedom of testation and of contract, see MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY 668, 691–92 (Guenther Roth & Clause Wittich eds., Bedminster Press 
1968) (1922). For a comparative geographical study of freedom of testation, see 
JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH 21–82 (Thomas Dunlap trans., Princeton 
Univ. Press 2008) (2004). 
 35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178–179 (1981); see id. 
§ 178 cmts. b–c (recognizing that the analysis requires a “balancing of inter-
ests”); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 58–77 
(1993). An alternative, more flexible response would be to tax contracts that 
implicate spillover costs, causing contractors to adjust to actual costs—what 
economists call a Pigouvian tax, in honor of the theorist who developed the 
concept. See infra note 135. 
 36. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
243–45 (1986).  
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tracting parties may come to regret an agreement, either be-
cause they will have misjudged what would contribute to their 
utility or because they will have failed to take evolving, time-
inconsistent preferences into account. Lawmakers might then 
take it upon themselves to proscribe a type of contract or term 
that they have reason to believe will produce regret systemati-
cally.37 Although critics object to this paternalistic response as 
either speculative, growth inhibiting, or morally inappropriate 
for adults,38 a number of existing laws appear motivated by this 
aim. Rules barring the sale of social security and other pension 
benefits, for example, protect “myopic”39 employees, those who 
discount their future security, from decisions their later selves 
would likely condemn.40 At the same time, most if not all such 
rules also involve spillover costs (radiating, for example, from 
destitution in old age) that comprise a dual policy considera-
tion.41 
If paternalism is grounded in utilitarian concerns, other 
limitations on freedom of contract are equitable or welfarist in 
conception. Lawmakers minded to bring about a “fair” division 
of wealth in society may regulate the allocation of gains from 
trade in order to achieve what they perceive as distributive jus-
tice.42 Regulations of this sort have taken either of two forms. 
 
 37. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE 
L.J. 763 passim (1983). Professor Radin argues that rendering inalienable 
those aspects of property central to “personhood” is freedom enhancing rather 
than paternalistic, for once they are lost the individual forfeits the capacity for 
“proper self-development” that is itself essential for freedom. Margaret Jane 
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1898–99 (1987). This 
criticism may largely revolve around semantics, for advocates of paternalism 
agree that the regret they seek to avert in others can be profoundly demoraliz-
ing. E.g., Kronman, supra, at 782.  
 38. TREBILCOCK, supra note 35, at 147–63; Rochelle Spergel, Note, Pater-
nalism and Contract: A Critique of Anthony Kronman, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 
593, 607–24 (1988). For more general critiques, see, for example, DONALD 
VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 69–70 (1986); Danny Scoccia, Pa-
ternalism and Respect for Autonomy, 100 ETHICS 318 passim (1990). 
 39. On the phenomenon of myopia (also known as akrasia or hyperbolic 
discounting in the nomenclature of cognitive psychology), see, for example, 
JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 470–83 (3d ed. 2000).  
 40. Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evi-
dence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1299, 1317–18 (1991). For 
additional references, see Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Poli-
cy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 23 & n.78 (1995). 
 41. See Kronman, supra note 37, at 764 (acknowledging this common 
duality).  
 42. For the seminal discussion, see Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law 
and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 passim (1980); see also Kronman, 
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Some rules operate across the board to police specific relation-
ships where lawmakers apprehend a danger of systematic dis-
tributive inequities resulting from unequal bargaining power. 
Hence, rules limiting interest rates for loans, requiring warran-
tees of habitability, or setting minimum wages regulate con-
tractual relations between creditor and debtor, landlord and 
tenant, employer and employee, shifting wealth in each in-
stance from the first group to the second.43 Alternatively, law-
makers can enforce equitable limits on freedom of contract 
case-by-case. The defense of substantive unconscionability ap-
pears premised on the notion that when contracts become too 
“one-sided,” possibly for that reason alone, but more clearly 
when the party disproportionately enriched also has less need, 
they produce distributive injustice.44 
Turning, by comparison, to freedom of testation, one ration-
ale for narrowing contractual freedom has no general bearing: 
paternalism cannot underlie a critique of testamentary liberty. 
A will takes effect only after a testator dies. Once that event oc-
curs, lawmakers need fret no longer about the testator’s wellbe-
ing; the dead lose their capacity either to regret or, for that 
matter, to celebrate their decisions. Paternalism could hold mer-
it for parties who would otherwise kick themselves (including, 
perhaps, beneficiaries).45 Decedents just spin in their graves. 
At the same time, testamentary transfers do have distribu-
tive consequences that commentators sometimes condemn as 
 
supra note 37, at 771–72. Dean Kronman propounds a normative defense of 
this use of contract law both within the parameters of liberal political theory 
and even libertarian theory. For a response to the second claim, see Larry Al-
exander & William Wang, Natural Advantages and Contractual Justice, 3 
LAW & PHIL. 281 passim (1984).  
 43. Kronman, supra note 42, at 473. But see TREBILCOCK, supra note 35, 
at 252–53 (questioning the need for regulation so long as businesses of compar-
able size and power compete with each other to trade with consumers).  
 44. Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
105, 135–36 (2008) (“While the doctrine of unconscionability is not explicitly 
framed in distributive terms, its distributive aspects have been often noted 
. . . . [C]ourts usually do not apply the doctrine to the benefit of rich victims.”). 
On the doctrine of substantive unconscionability, see generally Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 748–
85 (1982); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s 
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 509–17 (1967). 
 45. For a further discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 26. 
Nonetheless, limitations on the right to make inter vivos gifts, concerning 
which the donor’s capacity to regret remains intact, could be premised on pa-
ternalism. For discussions, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND 
143–47 (1998); E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises and Paternalism, 41 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 385 passim (2000). 
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unjust.46 The injustice in these instances flows from the distri-
bution not of net gains, but of gross receipts, in relation to 
preexisting inequalities. Likewise, testamentary transfers 
sometimes implicate market failures that lawmakers and 
commentators cite to justify constraints on freedom of testa-
tion. 
In sum, although the problems of freedom of contract and 
freedom of testation are not identical, they do appear closely 
enough connected to make comparative analysis a useful exer-
cise. To the extent that substantive asymmetries between the 
boundaries of each freedom emerge, they demand either justifi-
cation or rectification within a consolidated theory of freedom of 
transfer. There remains, though, a second and even more im-
portant correspondence to bear in mind—one of substitutabili-
ty, as opposed to analogy. A contract resembles a will sufficient-
ly that one can sometimes replace the other; a testator could 
look to either as a tool of estate planning. To the extent con-
tracts and wills can perform equivalent functions, asymmetric 
restrictions on freedom of transfer become not merely inconsist-
ent, but incompatible. As such, they are also inequitable, allow-
ing the better counseled to accomplish through clever exploita-
tion of instrumental “loopholes” what the more poorly coun-
seled cannot. These asymmetries should carry an indelible 
mark of illegitimacy.  
Let us keep all of this in view as we turn to a more detailed 
examination of freedom of testation and its limits. 
II.  FORBIDDEN CONDITIONS   
A. PERSONAL CONDUCT 
A testator may saddle a bequest with conditions. So long as 
the beneficiary fulfills a condition, he or she can receive the in-
heritance (either as a delayed lump sum or as a continuing in-
come stream). Otherwise, the beneficiary forfeits the interest. 
Conditional bequests are ordinarily valid—but not always. If 
 
 46. To be sure, the very institution of inheritance is open to criticism with-
in liberal political theory. Cf., e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN 
THE LIBERAL STATE 201–07 (1980); D.W. Haslett, Distributive Justice and In-
heritance, in IS INHERITANCE LEGITIMATE? 133 passim (Guido Erreygers & 
Toon Vandevelde eds., 1997); Michael B. Levy, Liberal Equality and Inherited 
Wealth, 11 POL. THEORY 545 passim (1983). The instant analysis accepts that 
institution as a given and considers only the distributive consequences of free-
dom of testation within a legal system that permits private inheritance of 
property by successive generations.  
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the condition entails conduct “contrary to public policy or viola-
tive of some rule of law,” the condition is void.47 Thus, a condi-
tion attached to a bequest requiring the beneficiary to commit a 
crime is invalid.48 This much is readily justifiable as avoiding 
spillover costs. The rule shadows one within contract law, void-
ing contracts that call for or comprise the commission of 
crimes.49 
Intriguingly, lawmakers have gone farther. As elaborated 
in the Restatement of Property, if a testator conditions a be-
quest on the beneficiary’s marital decisions, the condition may 
fail. The issue hinges on whether or not the condition was in-
tended “unreasonably [to] limit the . . . opportunity to marry.”50 
A conditional bequest intended to encourage separation or di-
vorce likewise fails.51 At the same time, a conditional bequest 
designed to influence religious affiliation, or personal habits 
(such as abstemiousness), or pursuit of an education or a par-
ticular occupation is valid, according to the Restatement.52 
Although less detailed in its treatment, the Restatement of 
Contracts tracks these limitations.53 That is as it should be, for 
conditional bequests are not true gratuities at all. Like a con-
tract, they require performance of a quid pro quo. Considered 
structurally, in fact, we may just as well describe a conditional 
bequest as a unilateral contract offer made at death. No reason 
appears why a contract offer made during life, calling for per-
 
 47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.1 (1983). 
The third Restatement of Property fails to revisit the problem, although it ac-
knowledges generally the doctrine limiting “unreasonable restraints on 
. . . marriage.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c (2003). The third Restatement of Property also endorses 
the “[p]ublic policy . . . limit[s] [on the] freedom of disposition” set out in the 
third Restatement of Trusts, discussed infra notes 65, 72 and accompanying 
text, although the third Restatement of Property contains no express proposal 
to duplicate those limits and apply them to conditional bequests out of trust. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS div. 
VIII, scope of div. VIII (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2010) (approved May 2010).  
 48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.1 cmt. c 
(1983).  
 49. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). 
 50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 (1983). 
The limitation only applies to conditions that continue postmortem. A condi-
tion that a beneficiary must meet before the death of the testator is indistin-
guishable from a threat of disinheritance and hence is per se valid. Id. § 6.1 
cmt. c & illus. 5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i(2) (2003). 
 51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.1 (1983). 
 52. Id. §§ 8.1–.3. 
 53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 189–190 (1981). 
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formance that could continue after death, should be judged ac-
cording to a different standard. 
It is therefore striking, and sadly typical, that as concerns 
void terms and conditions, neither the Restatement of Con-
tracts nor the Restatement of Property ever once cross-
references the other. Rather than analogize contractual re-
straints on marriage to testamentary ones, the Restatement of 
Contracts analogizes the problem to restraints on trade, cov-
ered elsewhere in the same Restatement.54 Model lawmakers 
working in the areas of contracts and wills have launched doc-
trinal ships in the night. That the two have managed nonethe-
less to chart an approximately parallel course testifies to law-
makers’ like-mindedness concerning these problems. Still, 
when lawmakers sail along independently, some scattering be-
comes predictable. Their doctrines have drifted apart in a num-
ber of respects, as reflected in the two Restatements.  
One inconsistency involves the scope of permissible re-
straints. Under both Restatements a comprehensive restraint 
on any first marriage is invalid.55 Both Restatements also agree 
that the validity of partial restraints on first marriages de-
pends on their reasonability. But in the course of elaborating 
this characteristic, the two Restatements offer illustrations 
that appear to conflict. For instance, under the Restatement of 
Property, a condition in a bequest to a sixty-year-old unmarried 
sister that she not marry before the age of eighty is invalid.56 
By comparison, under the Restatement of Contracts a condition 
not to marry in a contract between a fifty-year-old unmarried 
niece, promising housekeeping services, and her seventy-year-
old uncle, promising a payment upon his death, is reasonable 
 
 54. Id. § 189 cmt. a. Nevertheless, some commentators, along with the oc-
casional court, have spied the categorical analogy. See Estate of Robertson, 
859 N.E.2d 772, 775–76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); see also Cooke v. Turner, (1846) 
153 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1047 (L.R. Exch.); 15 M. & W. 727, 736; 2 JOHN NORTON 
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 933, at 1955 (4th ed. 
1918) (“intimately connected . . . and depending upon the same principle”); 7 
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16:17, at 429–
30 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1997). The third Restatement of Trusts, cover-
ing a category straddling contracts and property, refers to provisions on condi-
tions found in the Restatements of both of those subjects, see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmts. i(2), j (2003), although the Restatement of Trusts 
declines to follow either. See infra note 65. 
 55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1(1) 
(1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 189 illus. 1 (1981) (by impli-
cation). 
 56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 illus. 6 
(1983). 
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and hence effective.57 Although the probability that such a con-
tract would continue to bind the fifty-year-old until the age of 
eighty is doubtless small,58 the two restraints seem roughly 
comparable. 
Of course, reasonability is a standard, and dueling illustra-
tions in a contractual and testamentary setting do not imply 
that a court must read and apply the two standards differently; 
by their nature, standards are fuzzy. The Restatements part 
company more tangibly, however, in two other respects. One 
concerns the relevance of motivation. The Restatement of Con-
tracts follows an objective standard of reasonability, never tak-
ing into consideration why a party to the contract imposed the 
condition.59 By contrast, the Restatement of Property follows a 
subjective standard. A bequest conditioned on not marrying 
takes effect without the condition only “[a]bsent any admissible 
evidence as to [the testator’s] motive.”60 Were evidence to dis-
close a “dominant motive” simply to provide support until mar-
riage, the condition would remain valid.61 
The other discrepancy concerns the consequences of inva-
lidity. Under the Restatement of Property, when the court finds 
a condition void, the bequest remains effective and becomes un-
conditional.62 By contrast, under the Restatement of Contracts, 
the court can either invalidate the condition and excuse its 
nonperformance but still enforce the other party’s promise or 
invalidate the entire contract, depending on whether the court 
 
 57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 189 illus. 2 (1981). 
 58. According to the Social Security Administration’s 2006 actuarial 
tables, the average life expectancy of a man of seventy is 13.55 years. Period 
Life Table, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6 
.html (last visited April 27, 2011).  
 59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 189–190 (1981). The 
Restatement cites approvingly a case expressly distinguishing its objective ap-
proach from a subjective one. Id. § 190 reporter’s note to cmt. a (citing In re 
Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 328 (Cal. 1976)). 
 60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 illus. 1 
(1983). 
 61. Id. § 6.1(2) & cmt. e; see also id. §§ 6.2 cmts. g–h, 6.3 cmt. f & illus. 7, 
7.1 & cmt. d, 7.2 & cmts. d–e, 8.1 cmt. d, 8.2 cmt. c, 8.3 cmt. d (applying sub-
jective analysis to other conditions); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 189 cmt. a (1981) (allowing contracts that objectively “serve 
some purpose other than that of merely discouraging marriage”). 
 62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1(1) & 
cmt. d & illus. 8 (1983); see also, e.g., Home For Incurables of Balt. City v. 
Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 797 A.2d 746, 751 (Md. 2002). Some early cases 
invalidated the entire bequest, however. Olin L. Browder, Illegal Conditions 
and Limitations: Effect of Illegality, 47 MICH. L. REV. 759, 760–62 (1949).  
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finds that the unenforceable condition “was [or was not] an es-
sential part of the agreed exchange.”63 If the void condition, 
such as not marrying, comprised the sole consideration for the 
transfer, then the court presumably would find the contract 
invalid and not enforce the transfer.64  
These asymmetries aside, we may question the soundness 
of limitations on the validity of conditional transfers of this 
sort. Those limitations have now been cast into sharp relief by 
the promulgation of still another Restatement project, the third 
Restatement of Trusts. In contrast to the second Restatements 
of Property and Contracts, and contrary to most of the case law, 
this new Restatement would broadly invalidate trust conditions 
restraining marriage, divorce, religious practice, and occupa-
tion—thereby cutting back on the current latitude of freedom of 
testation.65 
The rationale articulated in the Restatements of Property 
and Contracts for limits on the validity of marital conditions is 
the public policy in favor of ensuring that citizens have an op-
portunity to marry. As expressed in the Restatement of Con-
tracts, “the freedom of individuals to marry should not be im-
paired except for good reason.”66 As reiterated in the 
 
 63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 185 & cmt. b (1981). 
 64. Compare McCoy v. Flynn, 151 N.W. 465, 468 (Iowa 1915) (holding that 
a party who had fulfilled a promise not to marry for three years in exchange for 
a promised payment of $5000 could not recover under the invalid contract), with 
King v. King, 59 N.E. 111, 112 (Ohio 1900) (holding that a party who had ful-
filled a promise to provide caregiving services for the second party and not to 
marry during the second party’s lifetime was enforceable against the second par-
ty, even though the term in the contract restraining marriage was void, because 
that term comprised “a mere incident to the main purpose” of the contract). 
 65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 & cmts. i–l (2003); cf. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62 & cmts. b–j (1959) (giving greater def-
erence to testamentary intent). The position taken by the third Restatement of 
Trusts is adopted by the Uniform Trust Code, see UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 
cmt. (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 484 (2006), and several non-Uniform state 
statutes. Because only trusts fall within the remit of this Restatement, a tes-
tator can create a conditional bequest out of trust in order to avoid its poten-
tial application. The case law, however, has not traditionally distinguished the 
treatment of conditions in and out of trust. 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., 
SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS §§ 9.3.5–.8 (5th ed. 2006); see also In re Estate 
of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 895, 902 (Ill. 2009) (observing, in a marital re-
striction case not directly concerned with a trust, that “[t]he public policy of 
the state of Illinois . . . is . . . one of broad testamentary freedom,” and that 
“[w]e have not yet had reason to consider whether any section of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Trusts . . . is an accurate expression of Illinois law”).  
 66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 189 cmt. a (1981).  
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Restatement of Property, “coercing abstention from marriage” 
via a gratuitous transfer is “socially undesirable.”67 
Taken literally, this rationale should lead toward doctrinal 
qualifications that fail to emerge from the case law. Under this 
theory, only conditions unreasonably proscribing marriage 
could potentially violate public policy; those prescribing mar-
riage should not. Thus, consider a bequest conditioned on not 
marrying outside a particular group—typically, but not neces-
sarily, adherents of a specified religious faith. The Restatement 
of Property offers as its example a bequest of income “to my son 
S for life, provided that, if he ever marries a person not of the 
Catholic faith” the income interest terminates.68 The Restate-
ment would give effect to such a condition so long as the num-
ber of permitted marital partners is sufficiently large as to 
make marriage realistically possible, and so long as the benefi-
ciary’s own beliefs (such as devotion to a different faith) will not 
preclude marriage to one of those permitted partners.69 This 
approach follows logically from the Restatement’s rationale70 
and could be extended to proscriptions of marriage to persons 
outside a given ethnic group or, in the twenty-first century, to 
persons of a given gender.  
Yet, suppose the bequest were worded differently: income 
to S for life “if he marries a person of the Catholic faith.” Thus 
framed, the bequest creates an incentive to marry a Catholic, 
but creates no disincentive to marry anyone else; a beneficiary 
who abstains from marriage receives the same treatment as 
one who marries a Protestant. Such a condition should not vi-
 
 67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. a 
(1983).  
 68. Id. § 6.2 illus. 3. 
 69. Id. § 6.2 cmts. a, c, f & illus. 3. For case law, see Maddox v. Maddox’s 
Adm’r, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) 804, 808–09 (1854). 
 70. One of the Restatement’s illustrations appears flawed, however. It ad-
dresses the scenario of a bequest to a daughter to be forfeited if she ever mar-
ries a named person, leaving a nearly universal set of permitted marital part-
ners. Nevertheless, the Restatement posits, if the daughter was engaged to 
that named person when the bequest matured, the condition is void, because 
in that event “a marriage permitted by the restraint was not likely to occur.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 illus. 1 (1983). 
But see Graydon’s Ex’rs v. Graydon, 23 N.J. Eq. 229, 236–38 (Ch. 1872) (hold-
ing to the contrary), rev’d on other grounds, 25 N.J. Eq. 561 (1874). What a 
sentimental notion! If the beneficiary is prevailed upon to break her engage-
ment, the illustration assumes, she is unlikely to marry anyone else. More real-
istically, the circumstance of engagement to a forbidden partner does not make 
marriage by the beneficiary improbable—it simply makes her willingness to 
carry out the condition improbable. 
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olate public policy, at least as propounded by the Restatement. 
The case law, however, fails to distinguish proscriptive and 
prescriptive conditions, assessing both under a reasonability 
standard.71  
This being so, the cases appear to reflect a more far-
reaching public policy than the one indicated in the Restate-
ments: a policy not to favor marriage, strictly speaking, but to 
favor marital choice. As concerns a decision so personal as mar-
riage, lawmakers wish citizens to be free from “unreasonable” 
interference by third parties, which would include incentives 
they create either to remain unmarried or to marry within 
closely confined groups. The third Restatement of Trusts 
adopts this position and expands it to cover most marital condi-
tions. To give effect to these conditions would allow the testator 
to “exert[] a socially undesirable influence on the exercise or 
nonexercise of fundamental rights that significantly affect the 
personal lives of beneficiaries and often of others as well.”72  
Nevertheless, in assessing the public policy of all condi-
tional bequests, we must remember that the influence they ex-
ert comes in the shape of a blandishment, and not a shotgun. 
The weddings (or bachelorhoods) that ensue stem not from 
coercion, but from the beneficiary’s appraisal of what matters 
more to him or her—money or matrimonial preference.73 If 
 
 71. The Restatement’s illustrations cover only proscriptions of marriage. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 illus. 1–3 
(1983); cf. In re Silverstein’s Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (Sur. Ct. 1956) (pre-
scriptive condition held valid if “reasonable”); Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 
315 N.E.2d 825, 826, 828–29 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974) (same); In re Estate of 
Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250–51 (Pa. 1967) (upholding one prescriptive condi-
tion, but striking down another that encouraged divorce). No published cases 
have tested the validity of a condition proscribing marriage to anyone but a 
named person, or, by contrast, of a condition prescribing marriage to a named 
person, so their respective legality remains uncertain. Some courts have dis-
tinguished the validity of conditions on the basis of their technical form. The 
Restatement criticizes these distinctions, as have many courts. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. b & reporter’s note 3 
(1983); see also, e.g., Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 99 A. 672, 674 (Md. 1916); Win-
ters v. Miller, 261 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1970) (“a purely seman-
tic whimsy”). 
 72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 & cmt. i (2003). This statement 
is generally applicable to marital conditions, religious conditions, and occupa-
tional conditions. See id. § 29 cmt. i(2). The third Restatement retains a reason-
ability standard but redefines it to bar all religious restrictions on marriage, 
although restrictions on underage marriage continue to be deemed reasonable. 
See id. § 29 cmt. j & illus. 2–3.  
 73. In this connection, the case law uniformly denies that marital condi-
tions in wills raise constitutional issues under Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
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lawmakers deem this sort of bargain undesirable, they must 
address the nature of its undesirability—what is it about the 
bargain that justifies interference with freedom of transfer?  
Surely, it is not enough to say that the condition imposes a 
cost, at least by comparison to an unconditional bequest. As in 
connection with other bargains, this cost is offset by the utility 
benefactors gain from performance of a condition, which they 
forfeit when confined to making unconditional bequests. All 
else being equal, the bargain is Pareto optimal; whenever the 
cost to a beneficiary exceeds the value on offer, he or she will 
simply decline the bequest. 
Nor is social disapproval of tyrannical conditions an ade-
quate basis for intrusions by government upon freedom of 
transfer. As one court put the matter arrestingly, “a man’s prej-
udices are a part of his liberty.”74 Freedom of transfer brings 
economic benefits. When lawmakers mind people’s business for 
reasons other than market failures, business suffers. And, 
whether we like it or not, the incentives created by a condition-
al bequest are indistinguishable from other mercenary consid-
erations that might factor into a person’s decision to marry, or 
to forebear from marrying, a potential partner.75 
 
(1948). See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 904–05 (Ill. 2009); 
Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 827–28 (citing Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228 
(Mass. 1955) and U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860 (Or. 1954)); see 
also In re Kempf ’s Will, 297 N.Y.S. 307, 312 (App. Div. 1937) (observing that a 
conditional bequest setting forth religious affiliation conditions could have 
been declined on conscience grounds), aff’d, 16 N.E.2d 123 (1938) (per curiam); 
In re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d. 520, 525–26 (Pa. 1975) (same). 
 74. Keffalas, 233 A.2d at 250 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). See also infra notes 144–47, 158 and accompanying text.  
 75. See Chaachou v. Chaachou, 73 So. 2d 830, 838 (Fla. 1954) (“If mar-
riage for convenience and business reasons is sufficient to hold the agreement 
illegal, it might be hard to sustain the legality of countless thousands of mar-
riages.”); Piper v. Hoard, 13 N.E. 626, 629 (N.Y. 1887) (“Marriage has its sen-
timental and its business sides.”). As empirical evidence shows, rich persons 
have small difficulty finding marital partners. See Gary Burtless, Effects of 
Growing Wage Disparities and Changing Family Composition on the U.S. In-
come Distribution, 43 EUR. ECON. REV. 853, 856 tbl.2 (1999) (showing mar-
riage rates as correlated with higher earnings). Once again, popular culture 
has often depicted or parodied these social verities. See, e.g., A NEW LEAF 
(Aries Productions 1971); HOW TO MARRY A MILLIONAIRE (20th Century Fox 
Corp. 1953); cf. THE DEVIL AND MISS JONES (Frank Ross-Norma Krasna Inc. 
1941) (reversing the formula, for comic effect, into an aversion to marrying 
wealth). For a further parody offered in connection with a conditional bequest, 
see BERNARD SHAW, The Devil’s Disciple, in THREE PLAYS FOR PURITANS 3, 22 
(New York, Brentano’s 1906) (1897). Needless to add, these influences move 
men and women alike. See, e.g., SARAH BRADFORD, AMERICA’S QUEEN 67–68 
(2000) (noting Jacqueline Bouvier’s pursuit of wealth through marriage); Mar-
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One conceivable ground for invalidating marital conditions 
is the prospect of errors of judgment—that is, the risk that ben-
eficiaries will in time regret fulfilling a marital condition in or-
der to obtain a bequest. Unlike testators, beneficiaries accept-
ing conditions that from their perspective are inter vivos can 
profit from paternalistic protection, if lawmakers deem it war-
ranted.76 Still, marital decisions are reversible, making the re-
gret associated with them transitory. If a beneficiary regrets a 
“convenient” marriage, or bachelorhood, as an error in judg-
ment, he or she can still take steps to redress the error. 
Another possible ground for invalidating marital conditions 
is their potential inefficiency when they generate spillover 
costs—what the third Restatement of Trusts refers to in plainer 
language as the adverse impact of conditions on the “lives of 
beneficiaries and often of others as well.”77 The fact remains 
that when a condition bars marriage, no individual apart from 
the beneficiary directly experiences the consequences. Perhaps 
freedom to marry implicates a kind of network effect by in-
creasing the likelihood that others can discover a preferred 
partner; vice versa, impediments to marriage reduce that like-
lihood. But so long as conditions restraining marriage remain 
relatively uncommon, leaving a large universe of available 
partners, the effect should be negligible. 
Other possible costs merit attention. English courts identi-
fied state interests as the original public policy against condi-
tions restraining marriage, namely the political imperative of 
demographic growth—plainly an archaic notion today.78 Mod-
ern economists contemplating marriage as an institution asso-
ciate with it various private efficiencies but no social benefits 
lost by abstention from marriage.79 At the same time, sociolo-
 
go Howard, The Warner Touch, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 7, 1983, at 9, 9 (noting 
the same pursuit by the young John Warner, who married a Mellon and be-
came a U.S. senator). 
 76. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Conditional bequests may 
themselves stem from testators’ efforts to paternalize beneficiaries, encourag-
ing choices that testators believe will serve beneficiaries’ best interests. Robert 
A. Pollak, Tied Transfers and Paternalistic Preferences, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 
(PAPERS & PROC.) 240, 240–44 (1988).  
 77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003) (emphasis added); 
see also supra text accompanying note 72. 
 78. Olin Browder, Jr., Conditions and Limitations in Restraint of Mar-
riage, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1288, 1288–89 (1941). 
 79. The efficiencies of marriage involve the division of labor within fami-
lies, risk pooling, and economies of scale. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE 
FAMILY 30–79 (enlarged ed. 1991); WILLIAM A. LORD, HOUSEHOLD DYNAMICS 
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gists posit benefits of marriage that are more dispersed and 
hence of potential interest to lawmakers. Studies suggest that 
unmarried persons—“bare branches” in a Chinese idiom80—are 
more likely to commit crime or to enter unstable substrata of 
society,81 a predicament that can occur naturally by virtue of 
unbalanced sex ratios that now loom in some Asian countries,82 
resulting in a “marriage squeeze.”83 In the instant case, though, 
a beneficiary subject to an artificial marriage squeeze receives 
a transfer in compensation for remaining unmarried. This ag-
grandizement of economic status should tend to counteract 
whatever social hazards attend his or her marital status. 
A condition that encourages marriage within a prescribed 
group fails even to implicate social hazards. Such a condition 
could affect the happiness of marital partners whom beneficiar-
ies would not otherwise have agreed to marry, yet those part-
ners—like beneficiaries themselves—embark upon marriage 
willingly and with their eyes open. A testamentary condition 
that functions to encourage divorce, on the other hand, does en-
tail spillover costs, at least if there are children of the mar-
riage.84 Lawmakers may nevertheless treat those costs as func-
tionally internal, assuming the inheriting spouse has inter-
 
288–92 (2002). Marriage also contributes to health and longevity, with second-
ary ramifications for the social welfare system that have yet to be examined, 
and which do not necessarily yield a net economic gain (given the potential 
costliness of longevity). LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR 
MARRIAGE 47–64 (2000). Preliminary empirical research also suggests that 
marriage increases the rate of household saving, which affects the national 
economy, although the optimal level of national saving remains a controversial 
point among economists. Joseph P. Lupton & James P. Smith, Marriage, As-
sets, and Savings, in MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY 129 passim (Shoshana A. 
Grossbard-Shechtman ed., 2003).  
 80. VALERIE M. HUDSON & ANDREA M. DEN BOER, BARE BRANCHES 4, 
187–88 (2004). 
 81. Id. at 229–41; LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES 119–21 
(2006); S. Alexandra Burt et al., Does Marriage Inhibit Antisocial Behavior? 
An Examination of Selection vs Causation via a Longitudinal Twin Design, 67 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1309, 1313–15 (2010) (citing to earlier studies); 
Steven F. Messner & Robert J. Sampson, The Sex Ratio, Family Disruption, 
and Rates of Violent Crime: The Paradox of Demographic Structure, 69 SOC. 
FORCES 693, 705–08 (1991). 
 82. See supra note 80.  
 83. H.V. Muhsam, The Marriage Squeeze, 11 DEMOGRAPHY 291 passim 
(1974). 
 84. Sociologists have debated how serious those costs are; some scholars 
maintain that the harm to children caused by divorce is merely transient. The 
debate is summarized, and the dueling scholarship cited, in JAMES Q. WILSON, 
THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM 7–11, 166–75 (2002). 
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dependent utilities with his or her children and will decide 
whether the benefits attendant to inheriting exceed the costs 
for the family as a whole. Like marriage, a “divorce of conven-
ience” can find its justification in such a mercenary calculus.85 
The same analysis applies when benefactors meddle in ben-
eficiaries’ affairs as concerns selection of a career or devotion to 
a religious faith.86 Such conditions, concerning reversible deci-
sions, affect only the utilities of inheriting parties, creating no 
spillover costs in the bargain.87 And again, the financial in-
ducements on offer merely blend into the mélange of considera-
tions, mercenary and otherwise, that persuade a beneficiary to 
pursue one line of work or another, and even to join one sect or 
another.88  
 
 85. See Audrey Light & Taehyun Ahn, Divorce as Risky Behavior, 47 
DEMOGRAPHY 895, 916–17 (2010) (finding empirical evidence of a correlation 
between the propensity to divorce and individual economic risk tolerance); see 
also MCCLAIN, supra note 81, at 127–29 (“[A]lthough children in [single-
parent] families are at higher risk for certain unfavorable schooling and behav-
ioral outcomes, much of this disadvantage appears to stem from poverty rather 
than single parenting as such.”); WILSON, supra note 84, at 169 (“Matters may 
be better among the most affluent single moms, but most mothers will suffer a 
significant loss of income after they divorce.”).  
 86. For other sorts of behavioral conditions held valid by courts, see, for 
example, Griffin v. Sturges, 40 A.2d 758, 762 (Conn. 1944) (bequest condi-
tioned on abstemiousness); In re Estate of Lewis, 770 A.2d 619, 622–23 (Me. 
2001) (bequest conditioned on not harassing other family members).  
 87. See, e.g., In re Estate of Laning, 339 A.2d 520, 524 (Pa. 1975) (“Inas-
much as the result which the testatrix sought to accomplish—viz., affiliation of 
the beneficiaries with her religious faith via a conditional bequest—is neither 
illegal, immoral, tortious, or productive of any social evil, we see no basis upon 
which she should be denied the power to dispose of her property in this fa-
shion.”). Arguably, voluntary military service produces substantial spillover 
benefits for society, and conditions against such service are treated specially 
under the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. e (1983). 
 88. The suggestion that persons might respond to mercenary incentives 
when choosing a religion (as opposed to, or along with, a marital partner) 
would hardly surprise a social historian and, once again, is recognized within 
popular culture. A song popular in eighteenth-century Britain, The Vicar of 
Bray, recounted the career of a clergyman whose protean faith kept evolving to 
conform to the theology of each succeeding monarch. With every verse, the 
chorus recapitulated the clergyman’s most deeply held conviction:  
And this is Law, I will maintain 
Unto my Dying Day, Sir, 
That whatsoever King shall Reign, 
I will be Vicar of Bray, Sir! 
Anonymous, The Vicar of Bray, in A COLLECTION OF ENGLISH POEMS: 1660–
1800, at 693, 693–94 (Ronald S. Crane ed., 1932) (emphasis omitted).  
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In sum, economic analysis—applicable both to freedom of 
contract and freedom of testation—potentially justifies nullifi-
cation only of conditions that involve irreversible choices or 
that entail tangible spillover costs. Viewed dispassionately in 
that light, conditions encouraging tortious or criminal conduct 
plainly offend public policy; other conditions currently abro-
gated by law do not. Legal restrictions on those conditions 
ought to be relaxed, not—as the third Restatement of Trusts 
contemplates—expanded.89 But assuming lawmakers do place 
some restriction on conditional bequests, surely their validity 
should turn on their objective characteristics, as under the Re-
statement of Contracts, rather than on their subjective ones, as 
under the Restatement of Property.90 Were a testator, for ex-
ample, to bequeath an income interest to a beneficiary that 
terminates upon marriage, under the Restatement of Property 
the bequest’s validity hinges on whether the testator’s “domi-
nant motive” was to deter marriage or to provide support until 
marriage.91 Yet, the presence or absence of a particular mental 
 
 89. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. As currently formulated, 
the restrictions found in the Restatement of Property on the validity of marital 
conditions appear inconsistent with its rules concerning conditions pertaining 
to other personal choices, such as religious faith, of which the Restatement is 
more tolerant. In particular, the rules governing marital and religious condi-
tions coexist uneasily. If a beneficiary holds beliefs making marriage to a 
Catholic unlikely, and a bequest is conditioned on marrying a Catholic, the 
condition is void. Yet, a bequest to the same beneficiary conditioned on becom-
ing a Catholic is valid, according to the Restatement. See supra notes 59–61 
and accompanying text. The third Restatement of Trusts would invalidate 
both sorts of conditions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j & illus. 
3, cmt. k (2003). 
 90. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. The third Restatement 
of Trusts hedges: “[T]his Section is generally concerned with the objective effects 
of a provision rather than with the settlor’s underlying motive(s). Neverthe-
less, a subjective inquiry into the settlor’s reasons for including a provision in 
a trust may be relevant.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003). 
 91. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. The subjective test en-
dorsed by the Restatement of Property is confirmed by most of the case law. 
See, e.g., Graydon’s Ex’rs v. Graydon, 23 N.J. Eq. 229, 236–37 (Ch. 1872), rev’d 
on other grounds, 25 N.J. Eq. 561 (1874); In re Estate of Romero, 847 P.2d 319, 
322–23 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). But see Latorraca v. Latorraca, 26 A.2d 522, 526 
(N.J. Ch. 1942) (“[I]n this instance the court cannot, and does not, attempt to 
probe testator’s mind and determine his object in making provision for his wid-
ow and in terminating her estate upon remarriage.”); In re Estate of Keffalas, 
233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967) (“We cannot accept the contentions of appellants 
that evidence of an actual subjective intent to cause divorce is a prerequisite to 
striking down a condition based on divorce.”). Note that the requirement of an 
agreement between the parties to a contract is not a factor dictating an objec-
tive approach to the consideration of motive, in contradistinction to the mean-
ing of a contract. 
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state on the part of the testator has no bearing on the presence 
or absence of spillover costs. Subjective considerations are 
theoretically anomalous when the problem is viewed through 
an economic lens.92 If anything, the case for objectivity is 
stronger in respect of bequests than of contracts, given the rela-
tive magnitude of the evidentiary obstacles facing the court. 
Parties to a contract can testify as to their motives; testators 
cannot. 
As concerns the consequences of invalidity, the rule an-
nounced by the Restatement of Contracts whereby the court 
can invalidate either the condition or the contract provides 
greater flexibility than the rule established by the Restatement 
of Property, which invariably invalidates only the condition, 
never the underlying bequest.93 At the same time, the risks of a 
flexible rule loom larger in connection with bequests. Once 
again, the court cannot quiz the testator (unlike a contracting 
party) about his or her preferences in the wake of invalidity, 
complicating the evidentiary process and heightening the risk 
of fraud. The Restatement of Property avoids this risk by fol-
lowing a fixed default rule (although whether the Restatement 
has chosen the optimal default rule remains unclear).94 Even 
 
 92. Compare, by analogy, the treatment of bequests for purposes that sub-
serve, rather than disserve, public policy: in judging whether a trust purpose 
qualifies as charitable, “the motive of the settlor . . . is immaterial . . . . Even if 
the motive . . . is to spite his heirs, the trust is none the less a charitable trust 
if the purposes are charitable.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. 
d (1959); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003).  
 93. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. Again, the third Re-
statement of Trusts hedges: whereas “[o]rdinarily” a court reforms an invalid 
conditional interest under a trust by striking the condition but still providing 
the interest, “[a] different result may be reached . . . to avoid distorting the 
settlor’s underlying general plan for allocating his or her estate . . . .” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i(1) (2003). 
 94. The Restatement’s default rule, invalidating the offensive condition 
rather than the whole bequest, is justified in the accompanying comment on 
the theory that 
[i]f the law were . . . to take away the same economic benefit on the 
ground that the restraint, although invalid, was nevertheless a stated 
condition to the enjoyment of such benefit, the entire effect of the rule 
. . . would be vitiated, and the transferor would merely accomplish the 
purpose by another method.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. d (1983). 
This analysis is erroneous. If a bequest were void by virtue of an invalid condi-
tion, then the intended beneficiary would lose the bequest whether or not he or 
she fulfilled the condition, and he or she would have no incentive to do so. 
Thus, a rule invalidating the condition and one invalidating the bequest are 
equally compatible with public policy, and lawmakers should install the rule 
that a majority of testators would prefer. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 
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so, the Restatement of Property remains internally inconsis-
tent, in that it allows courts to consider extrinsic evidence 
when they reform impossible conditions, as opposed to void 
ones.95 Either alternative has its merits, making the issue 
double edged.96 
All of this is not uncontroversial.97 Indeed, the suggestion 
that marital conditions in wills are compatible with public poli-
cy has come under challenge by a scholar who, one might sup-
pose, would have inclined toward a laissez-faire approach. Ad-
dressing the problem in his treatise on law and economics, 
Judge Richard Posner observes that, on their face, legal restric-
tions on marital conditions “may seem wholly devoid of an eco-
nomic foundation.”98 Nevertheless, he continues, “the possibi-
lit[y] [of] modification . . . would exist if the gift were inter 
vivos rather than testamentary . . . [because the benefactor] 
might be persuaded to . . . relax the condition. If the [benefac-
tor] is dead, this kind of ‘recontracting’ is impossible, and the 
presumption that the condition is a reasonable one fails.”99 
Judge Posner here focuses on another form of market fail-
ure to justify restrictions on marital conditions—one having to 
do not with spillover costs, but with an internal impediment to 
bargaining. Living parties come to terms by negotiating or rea-
soning with each other; decedents, in the nature of things, re-
spond neither to pleas nor to price signals. This disability, if 
significant, would suggest a principled distinction not only be-
tween conditional gifts and bequests, but also between contrac-
tual terms and conditional bequests. But in fact, the concern 
 
15, at 1039–42. Do most testators who seek to create conditional bequests 
deem the property transfer as of primary importance and the condition as sec-
ondary, or vice versa? The answer to this question is by no means self-evident 
and demands empirical study. 
 95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.2 & 
cmts. a–h (1983).  
 96. For academic commentary in favor of the flexible approach, see 
THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 415 (2d ed. 1953); 
Browder, supra note 62, at 762–67.  
 97. For academic criticism of the validity of personal conduct conditions in 
wills, see Matthew Harding, Some Arguments Against Discriminatory Gifts 
and Trusts, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2011); Jeffrey G. Sherman, 
Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints 
on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273 passim. For an 
academic defense, see Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Tes-
tators, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 98. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 18.7, at 548 (7th 
ed. 2007). 
 99. Id.  
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extends beyond conditions to all forms of dead-hand control, ex-
erted once a testator becomes deaf to all importunities. Because 
the issue transcends conditions, we shall put off analysis of it 
until a later part of this Article.100 
B. NO-CONTEST CLAUSES  
There remains one other type of condition that lawmakers 
have cordoned off for special treatment. A testator might pro-
vide that beneficiaries forfeit their bequests under a will if they 
contest the will’s validity. States have divided over whether 
such a “no-contest” or “in terrorem” clause101 is effective. By 
statute in two jurisdictions, a no-contest clause is void per se.102 
Under the historical common law, though, a no-contest clause 
was effective per se,103 and this rule remains in place today in a 
minority of states.104 The modern majority rule, established ei-
ther by statute or by case law, lies in between: under the 
second and third Restatements of Property, together with the 
Uniform Probate Code, a no-contest clause is void when the 
court finds probable cause for the contest. The clause only takes 
effect in the absence of probable cause, where the contest com-
prises a frivolous suit or a strike suit.105 
Common-law cases following the historical rule enforcing 
no-contest clauses have justified it on the ground that in the 
matter of deterrence of will contests “the state has no interest 
 
 100. See infra notes 245–79 and accompanying text. 
 101. Thinking intercategorically, one Canadian court has referred to this as 
a “poison pill” clause. Foote Estate (Re) (2007), 431 A.R. 338, para. 9 (Alta. 
Q.B.). For a distinctly unconventional form of no-contest clause, see Virginia 
Court Voids Norwegian Man’s Will, VA. L. WKLY., Nov. 1, 2004, available at 
2004 WLNR 22725297 (noting a testamentary threat to haunt anyone who 
challenged the validity of the will). 
 102. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-2 
(West 2011).  
 103. This view was “represented by the vast preponderance of American 
opinion” in 1935. In re Brush’s Estate, 277 N.Y.S. 559, 561 (Sur. Ct. 1935). 
 104. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 
§ 13.3, at 643 & n.81 (4th ed. 2010); T. Jack Challis & Howard M. Zaritsky, 
State Survey of No Contest Clauses (Feb. 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author) (reporting that eleven states follow the common-law rule). 
 105. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-517 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 161 
(1998); id. § 3-905, 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 272 (1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1 (1983); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS 
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 (2003); Challis & Zaritsky, supra note 
104 (reporting that thirty states follow the probable cause standard or a simi-
lar standard, and also noting various other permutations in other states).  
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whatever apart from the interest of the parties themselves.”106 
Phrased in more technical language, no spillover costs of the 
sort sometimes found in connection with other kinds of condi-
tions appear in this instance. At least one court contrasted no-
contest clauses with marital conditions in this regard.107 
Meanwhile, testators can deter litigation that might stymie tes-
tamentary intent while potentially damaging their posthumous 
reputation. In the words of Justice David Brewer: 
[C]ontests are commenced wherein not infrequently are brought to 
light matters of private life that ought never to be made public, and in 
respect to which the voice of the testator cannot be heard either in 
explanation or denial, and, as a result, the manifest intention of the 
testator is thwarted. It is not strange, in view of this, that testators 
have desired to secure compliance with their dispositions of property 
and have sought to incorporate provisions which should operate most 
powerfully to accomplish that result.108 
Justice Brewer grasped intuitively what we would today 
call the second-best problem at work here. A no-contest clause 
becomes necessary only because of, and to compensate for, the 
testator’s ineluctable disappearance, hence his or her inability 
to testify at a proceeding challenging the will’s effectiveness, or 
to deal with contestants otherwise. But again, the impact of a 
no-contest clause is largely confined to the parties contemplat-
ing the challenge. If it has any significant spillover effects, 
these appear salutary in nature. The clause discourages costly 
litigation that the state traditionally subsidizes and that “en-
genders animosities and arouses hostilities among the kinfolk 
of the testator, which may never be put to rest and which con-
tribute to general unhappiness.”109 
Defenders of the modern rule nullifying no-contest clauses 
where probable cause exists for the contest focus on the possi-
bility that a contest is meritorious—that the will is the product 
of incapacity, fraud, undue influence, or some other debility 
that will remain hidden if a will contest is successfully sup-
pressed. Indeed, undue influencers or perpetrators of fraud 
 
 106. Cooke v. Turner, (1846) 153 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1047 (L.R. Exch.); 15 M. 
& W. 727, 736. 
 107. See id. (“The conditions said to be void . . . are those which restrain a 
party from doing some act which it is supposed the state has or may have an 
interest to have done. The state, from obvious causes, is interested that its 
subjects should marry . . . .”).  
 108. Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 415 (1898); see also, e.g., 
Rudd v. Searles, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass. 1928) (reiterating this reasoning). 
 109. Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886. A no-contest clause thus helps to ensure 
“peace and harmony of the living.” Id. 
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might themselves be responsible for including no-contest claus-
es in wills executed as a result of their wrongdoing.110 In such 
an event, public policy demands that “the jurisdiction of the 
court to determine the validity of a donative transfer not be de-
feated.”111 To rule otherwise would furnish wrongdoers “with a 
helpful cover for their wrongful designs.”112 A probable cause 
rule for no-contest clauses ostensibly reconciles these policies 
by fending off unmeritorious litigation, while at the same time 
blocking efforts to avert bona fide challenges. 
On first sight, this rule seems ideal. Yet appearances can 
deceive, and a number of problems emerge when we examine 
the issue more closely.113 One difficulty is simply the rule’s 
want of economy. If a no-contest clause were valid per se, then 
the case would turn on a single determination: whether or not a 
contest succeeds. If it did succeed, then the will would fall, and 
the no-contest clause would fall with it. Otherwise the will 
would stand and the no-contest clause would take effect. Vice 
versa, when a no-contest clause operates only in the absence of 
probable cause, and the contestant’s challenge succeeds, then 
once again the will and the no-contest clause would fall togeth-
er. But now, by contrast, if the will were upheld, then the case 
would turn on a second determination, namely, whether proba-
ble cause for the contest existed. In other words, the probable 
cause rule can give rise to an extra layer of litigation, and thus 
to additional costs.114 
On top of that, we have reason to doubt whether courts will 
resolve the issue of probable cause correctly. The difficulty is 
that the second determination—whether or not probable cause 
 
 110. Olin L. Browder, Jr., Testamentary Conditions Against Contests, 36 
MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1073 n.13 (1938).  
 111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 8.5 cmt. b (2003).  
 112. S. Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 101 A. 961, 963 (Conn. 1917); see al-
so, e.g., In re Friend’s Estate, 58 A. 853, 855 (Pa. 1904) (opining that a no-contest 
clause, if valid per se, would “intrench [sic] fraud and coercion more securely”). 
 113. For a prior academic criticism of the probable cause rule, see Martin 
D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the Final 
Threat, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 631–48 (1994). For a proposal to retain but modi-
fy the probable cause rule to narrow the circumstances under which a no-
contest clause is ineffective, see Gerry W. Beyer et al., The Fine Art of Intimi-
dating Disgruntled Beneficiaries with In Terrorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REV. 
225, 261–74 (1998).  
 114. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shumway, 9 P.3d 1062, 1063–69 (Ariz. 2000) 
(appealing the issue of probable cause); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, 633 S.E.2d 
722, 725–28 (S.C. 2006) (same). 
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existed—follows the initial determination on the merits of the 
suit. Psychological studies conducted in an assortment of set-
tings find that when persons review events in hindsight they 
tend to conceive of the outcome as obvious and inevitable, a 
phenomenon known in the literature as “hindsight bias.”115 
Like all cognitive limitations and heuristics, this tendency af-
fects judges too, for they are no less human.116 
How might hindsight bias distort the outcome of no-contest 
clause cases resolved under the probable cause rule? As defined 
in the Restatement, probable cause for a contest exists if, when 
viewed through the eyes of “a reasonable person, . . . there was 
a substantial likelihood” that the contest would succeed.117 This 
rule comes into play only if the contest fails; otherwise, the will 
(and all its clauses) are void. So, assuming the contest does fail, 
courts examining the contest in hindsight should tend to see it 
as having been destined to fail all along. In short, they are like-
ly to find the absence of probable cause, with the result that the 
no-contest clause will remain valid. If this tropism exists, then 
the probable cause rule—so easy to distinguish in theory—
should in practice lean closer to the historical common-law rule, 
which is cheaper to implement. 
Putting all of this to one side, how might we examine the 
problem comparatively from the perspective of contract law? No 
direct analogue to a no-contest clause appears within contracts 
because such a clause serves a purpose only if a party is absent 
 
 115. For summaries of, and references to, the relevant studies, see BARON, 
supra note 39, at 145–46; SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING 35–37 (1993). 
 116. For scholarly discussions of hindsight bias in other legal contexts, see, 
for example, Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773 
(2004); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
777, 799–805 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of 
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 
61, 73–81 (2000). But cf. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How 
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 24–29 (2007) (suggesting that 
where judges operate within “a web of complex rules” governing the outcome, 
such as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, they can more easily overcome 
hindsight bias—a circumstance lacking with regard to no-contest clause juris-
prudence); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Infor-
mation? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 
1314–18 (2005) (finding no evidence of judicial hindsight bias in an experi-
mental study based on a Fourth Amendment scenario). 
 117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 8.5 cmt. c (2003). 
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when issues concerning the transfer’s validity arise.118 Never-
theless, as regards transfers at death we can envision an 
equivalent to a no-contest clause that accomplishes the same 
purpose via contractual means. Suppose a testator anticipates 
a will contest and wishes to forestall it. He or she could include 
a no-contest clause in the will. Or, he or she could make a uni-
lateral contract offer to disinherited heirs, promising them a 
consideration in exchange for their promise not to contest the 
will. Is such a contract binding? Uniformly, the cases hold that 
it is.119 Yet, notice how the two strategies coincide: if a testator 
leaves potential contestants nothing under a will, a no-contest 
clause becomes toothless because would-be contestants have 
nothing to lose by bringing the contest. The clause weighs upon 
the minds of potential contestants only if the testator does be-
queath to them. Then they face a choice between (1) gambling 
on litigation, and (2) settling for the certainty of whatever 
amount the testator has left them under the will as an alterna-
tive to bringing the contest. That sum, offered under the will, is 
the functional equivalent of the sum offered by a testator to in-
duce a potential contestant contractually not to contest the will 
postmortem. In those jurisdictions that limit the effectiveness 
of a no-contest clause, freedom of contract appears broader 
than freedom of testation, even though the first can be applied 
to the very same purpose as the second. Courts and commenta-
tors have remained oblivious to the inconsistency.120 In Florida, 
for example, no-contest clauses are void per se by statute.121 
Yet, courts enforce contractual waivers of rights to contest 
wills, on the theory that “[t]he public policy of . . . Florida 
. . . highly favors settlement agreements.”122  
 
 118. See supra text accompanying note 109. Thus, no-contest clauses would 
serve no purpose within the context of an antemortem probate proceeding, 
were that option available to testators. Only a handful of jurisdictions current-
ly permit antemortem probate, however. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 104, 
§ 13.3, at 638–39. The nearest contracts analogue to a no-contest clause is an 
arbitration clause, which serves to streamline the process of dispute resolu-
tion. Similar sorts of provisions appear occasionally in wills. See Lela P. Love 
& Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More than Money: Mediation Clauses in Estate 
Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539 passim (2008). 
 119. See infra notes 120, 122. 
 120. Compare ATKINSON, supra note 96, at 408–10, with id. at 527. Like-
wise: compare 5 PAGE, supra note 4, § 44.29, at 566–67, with 2 id. § 25.7, at 
702–03, and 3 id. § 26.63, at 171. 
 121. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 2010). 
 122. Hernandez v. Gil, 958 So. 2d 390, 391 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).  
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Nor is the case any different when a wrongdoer is pulling 
the strings, manipulating the testator into inserting a no-
contest clause in the will. If the wrongdoer wanted to recreate 
the instrumentality of a no-contest clause in a jurisdiction lim-
iting its effectiveness, he or she would not even have to per-
suade the testator to offer potential contestants a contractual 
inducement not to contest. The matter could be handled just as 
easily postmortem. Compare the following scenarios: 
 
Scenario # 1: 
 
Exerting undue influence, A, unrelated to the testator, T, 
induces T to make A the primary beneficiary under T’s will but 
also induces T to include in the will a bequest of $50,000 to B, 
T’s heir who would inherit in the absence of a will, coupled with 
a no-contest clause. 
 
Scenario # 2: 
 
A induces T to bequeath T’s entire estate to A. B brings 
suit challenging the will’s validity on the ground of undue in-
fluence. A offers B the sum of $50,000 to settle B’s suit. 
 
The two scenarios are equivalent. B is put to the same 
stark choice in each instance between the certainty of $50,000 
and the uncertainty of winner-take-all litigation. Yet, in a 
probable cause jurisdiction, the validity of the no-contest clause 
in the first scenario will depend on the retrospective merits of 
the contest. By comparison, the validity of a litigation settle-
ment does not depend on the merits of the suit. 
If these scenarios are functionally indistinguishable, then 
they ought also to be legally indistinguishable. If they saw fit to 
do so, lawmakers could make contracts not to contest wills and 
private settlements of disputes about inheritance rights ineffec-
tive, or contingent on the absence of probable cause, in order to 
ensure—by analogy to the Restatement’s analysis of no-contest 
clauses—that “the jurisdiction of the court . . . [is] not . . . de-
feated.”123 Such a rule would rhyme with one partially or com-
pletely invalidating no-contest clauses. On the contrary, 
though, lawmakers have acted to facilitate probate settlement, 
 
 123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 8.5 cmt. b (2003). 
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whether before or after a contest is brought.124 Apart from 
avoiding the “animosities” of estate litigation that at least one 
court has labeled socially destructive,125 these agreements 
serve to minimize administrative costs, which to some extent 
the state would bear. 
Once again, the categorical segregation of wills and con-
tracts has created a legal blind spot, even at a point of function-
al overlap. 
III.  FORBIDDEN BEQUESTS   
Conditional bequests demand lawmakers’ scrutiny because 
performance of the condition might affect third parties. In addi-
tion, lawmakers have elected to forbid certain unconditional 
bequests. Those proscriptions may also hold merit, but only af-
ter we establish that the bequests at issue implicate deleterious 
collateral consequences. 
A. ENEMY ALIENS AND SLAYERS  
Suppose a testator makes a bequest to an enemy alien. Be-
cause the bequest strengthens the foreign power, lawmakers 
have reason to interdict the transfer. For the same reason, 
lawmakers often prohibit trading with enemy aliens. Thus, by 
federal law today, American citizens can neither bequeath to, 
nor contract with, Cuban nationals residing in Cuba.126 Be-
cause both sorts of transfers have the same spillover effect they 
should be treated alike, as at present they are.127 
 
 124. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-912 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 2 U.L.A. 279 
(1998) (giving effect to settlement agreements and barring personal represent-
atives from probating wills in spite of them); ATKINSON, supra note 96, at 528–
30 (“[The] law favors the settlement of disputes as to property matters.”). 
 125. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 126. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201, 515.310, 515.327 (2009); OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN. 
FLA., INHERITANCE BY CUBAN NATIONAL, ADVISORY LEGAL OPINION NO. 84-02 
(1984), available at http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/1589BD 
5973E2CFFF85256584004DDEC4. 
 127. The only other current national proscription applies to citizens of 
North Korea. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.201, 500.310, 500.327 (2009). Erstwhile pro-
scriptions applicable to citizens of Cambodia and Vietnam were lifted in the 
1990s. Id. §§ 500.570, 500.578. A further regulation bars property transfers of 
any sort to identified terrorists without restriction as to nationality. Id. 
§§ 594.201, 594.312. Because the matter involves foreign relations, state stat-
utes affecting these rights are constitutionally suspect. See Zschernig v. Mil-
ler, 389 U.S. 429, 430–41 (1968) (invalidating a state statute limiting the in-
heritance rights of foreign citizens). 
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In a related vein, a will could include a bequest to a benefi-
ciary who proceeds to slay the testator. By statute in the vast 
majority of jurisdictions, the bequest is void.128 This rule ad-
justs the estate plan to the probable intent of the victim in most 
instances, for testators rarely wish to provide for their assas-
sins; only the speed of the assault typically stymies formal dis-
inheritance of the slayer.129 Yet, suppose we face the atypical 
case. A mortally wounded testator might linger for a time, and 
in the aftermath forgive his or her slayer, republishing the orig-
inal will. Or the testator might include Dr. Kevorkian in his or 
her will, in return for assisting in the testator’s suicide. The tes-
tator’s intent makes no difference. In the large majority of 
states, statutes barring inheritance by a slayer lay down man-
datory rules, not default rules of imputed intent.130 
Is this restriction on freedom of testation defensible? Here, 
no harmful condition is attached to the bequest. It simply pro-
vides property to a particular party. Nonetheless, by insistently 
rewarding behavior that the state deems criminal, the testa-
tor’s choice of bequest itself causes social harm, operating per-
versely to encourage that behavior. Allowing a testator to over-
ride the bar would tend to undermine deterrence.131 In similar 
fashion, a contract for life insurance that expressly pays off 
even if the insured commits suicide is illegal, given the con-
 
 128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 8.4 reporter’s notes 1, 6 (2003). 
 129. For a further discussion, see Hirsch, Obsolescence, supra note 15, at 
620–23. 
 130. Only slayer statutes in Louisiana and Wisconsin allow a testator to 
override the statutory bar. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 941, 943, 945 (2000); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 854.14(6) (West 2002).  
 131. But see Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 
U. CIN. L. REV. 803 passim (1993) (suggesting that mercy killings be removed 
from the scope of statutory bans on inheritance by slayers). Professor Sherman 
argues that “because mercy killing cases clearly involve no mercenary mo-
tives,” lawmakers could carve out an exception from statutes barring inherit-
ance by slayers without compromising deterrence. Id. at 860, 873. He offers no 
evidence to support this empirical claim; yet, in some mercy killing cases, 
mixed motives have been alleged. E.g., Woman Denies Manipulating Eutha-
nased Partner, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. NEWS, June 4, 2008, available at 2008 
WLNR 10523189 (reporting an instance where the victim of an assisted sui-
cide changed his will a week before his death, naming his slayer as primary 
beneficiary). On the other hand, in those few jurisdictions that have legalized 
assisted suicide, see, e.g., Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1215–21 (Mont. 
2009), inheritance by an assisting physician should be permissible, given the 
state’s determination that the activity for which the bequest acts as an incen-
tive is not socially harmful.  
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tract’s tendency to induce illegal behavior.132 The two problems 
are structurally equivalent. That lawmakers have treated them 
alike attests to their capacity, at least on occasion, to maintain 
structural symmetry despite categorical division and without 
explicit comparative analysis. 
B. CAPRICIOUS PURPOSES 
Another sort of bequest that lawmakers forbid in certain 
instances takes a different form. Some wills allocate funds for 
the accomplishment of purposes, as opposed to the enrichment 
of individual beneficiaries. Testators usually fashion these be-
quests as trusts, whereby trustees are charged with expending 
trust funds in pursuit of testators’ objectives. If the purpose 
serves the public interest the trust is deemed charitable, and 
lawmakers not only give it effect but exempt it from taxation.133 
Conversely, if the purpose harms the public interest the trust is 
deemed against public policy, and lawmakers prohibit its crea-
tion.134 
In both of these instances, by definition, the testator’s es-
tate plan touches third parties, and these spillover effects dic-
tate legal doctrine. Where the effect is a positive one, lawmak-
ers encourage creation of the trust with what is technically 
called a Pigouvian subsidy (in the form of tax relief), as eco-
nomic theory dictates.135 Where the effect is a negative one, 
lawmakers disallow the trust, lest it impose costs on others. 
Yet, bequests for some purposes neither help nor harm so-
ciety. In economic terms, their spillover effects are either in-
consequential or negligible. As a matter of judicial doctrine, 
such a trust for a noncharitable purpose is permissible but not 
fully enforceable. Whereas the state attorney general has 
standing to sue a charitable trustee for breach of trust, no one 
has like standing to compel performance of a noncharitable-
purpose trust. Alternative beneficiaries can sue only to termi-
nate the trust when the trustee either initially or subsequently 
declines to carry it out. A noncharitable-purpose trust thus 
 
 132. Supreme Commandery of the Knights of the Golden Rule v. Ains-
worth, 71 Ala. 436, 447 (1882); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 572 & cmt. a & 
illus. 5 (1932); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 192 (1981) 
(reiterating the general principle but omitting the specific example). 
 133. I.R.C. §§ 501, 2055 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003). 
 134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003).  
 135. For the seminal discussion, see A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE 192–94 (4th ed. 1932). 
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takes effect as a mere power, technically (but confusingly) 
known as an honorary trust.136  
The leading scholar on trusts in his era, Professor Austin 
Scott, claimed that allowing testators to make enforceable pro-
visions for noncharitable purposes was contrary to public poli-
cy.137 Professor Scott failed to state the nature of his objection, 
however, and no other scholar or court has ever articulated a 
substantive justification for limiting bequests for noncharitable 
purposes to powers. The only explanation for honorary trust 
doctrine found in the cases and commentary is the absence of 
an enforcement mechanism. This assertion is tautological, for 
an honorary trust lacks an enforcement mechanism only be-
cause judges never created one. 
Modern statutory law does so. Every state today allows ben-
efactors to settle enforceable noncharitable-purpose trusts, ei-
ther for defined purposes (preservation of a gravesite in some 
states, care of a pet animal in others), or for all purposes.138 
Both the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Trust Code 
include omnibus provisions for noncharitable-purpose trusts, 
enforced against the trustee by a party named in the will or 
trust instrument, or appointed by the court.139 
A further limitation applies to these bequests, however. If 
a bequest for a noncharitable purpose, although benign, is ut-
terly pointless—such as publication of a worthless manu-
script140—or if a bequest for an otherwise valid noncharitable 
purpose is too extravagantly funded—Leona Helmsley’s $12 
million bequest for the care of “Trouble,” her white Maltese dog, 
in 2007 affords a notorious example141—the bequest becomes 
“capricious” and thereby contrary to public policy. This rule be-
gan as a qualification to the effectiveness of honorary trusts, 
 
 136. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. a (2003). 
 137. 2 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
§ 124, at 246 (4th ed. 1987) (“It is submitted that it is not in accordance with 
public policy that a decedent should be permitted to control the disposition of 
his property to this extent.”). The current editor of Scott’s treatise, Professor 
Mark Ascher, has quietly stricken this passage from the work. See 2 SCOTT ET 
AL., supra note 65, § 12.11.  
 138. For a recent tabulation of statutory law, see Adam J. Hirsch, Dela-
ware Unifies the Law of Charitable and Noncharitable Purpose Trusts, EST. 
PLAN., Nov. 2009, at 13, 15–16. 
 139. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 239 (1998); 
UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 408–409 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 490, 493 (2006). 
 140. E.g., Fid. Title & Tr. Co. v. Clyde, 121 A.2d 625, 629–30 (Conn. 1956). 
 141. Jeffrey Toobin, Rich Bitch, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2008, at 38, avail-
able at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/09/29/080929fa_fact_toobin.  
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set out in the Restatement of Trusts and followed in most 
(though not all) of the cases.142 The Commissioners subsequent-
ly imported the qualification into the Uniform Acts, and it is 
reproduced in most (though not all) of the state statutes vali-
dating full-fledged noncharitable-purpose trusts.143 
Mere caprice appears a doubtful standard on which to 
judge the validity of purpose-based bequests.144 Although these 
can again implicate spillover costs by virtue of the moral indig-
nation they provoke—as reflected, for instance, in the death 
threats Trouble received after news reports playing up her in-
heritance began to circulate145—estate plans rarely draw much 
publicity, and in any event the ill feelings they elicit, either 
within or without the family, are purely emotional; like other 
 
 142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47(2) (2003). For the original as-
sertion of the rule, see RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 124 & cmt. g (1935). For the 
case law, compare Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 71 n.140 (1999), with id. at 82 n.182. An equiva-
lent qualification now exists on wastefully funded charitable trusts under the 
Uniform Trust Code and the third Restatement of Trusts. Such a trust be-
comes not merely noncharitable but void as against public policy (although a 
court can subject the trust to cy pres). UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 404 & cmt., 413 & 
cmt. (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 484–85, 509–10 (2006); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 8 & cmt. g & illus. 18, 67 & cmt. c(1) (2003). This quali-
fication on charitable trusts did not, however, appear in the second Restate-
ment of Trusts. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959), 
with id. § 400 (contemplating cases where the charitable purpose is “fully ac-
complished” as opposed to wastefully funded). This qualification has also re-
mained absent from much, but not all, of the case law. See 6 SCOTT ET AL., su-
pra note 65, § 39.5.2, at 2726–28; Roger G. Sisson, Note, Relaxing the Dead 
Hand’s Grip: Charitable Efficiency and the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 
635, 641–44 (1988).  
 143. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-907(c)(6) (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 240 
(1998); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 404 & cmt., 409 & cmt. (amended 2005), 7C 
U.L.A. 484, 493–94 (2006). The meaning of the Uniform Probate Code’s provi-
sion on point is ambiguous, however. For further analysis and legislative histo-
ry, see Adam J. Hirsch, Trusts for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly in 
the Uniform Laws, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 918–20 (1999). Among the 
states, Delaware is notable in its validation of trusts for capricious nonchari-
table purposes. Hirsch, supra note 138, at 17. Under the Uniform Acts (albeit 
again not without ambiguity) and some non-Uniform state statutes, a court 
can cut capriciously overfunded trusts down to a reasonable size—a power 
that was invoked in the case of Helmsley’s trust for Trouble. Id. at 17 nn.43–
44; Toobin, supra note 141, at 41. Lawmakers could reasonably characterize 
wasteful trusts for charitable purposes as noncharitable on account of their 
want of social benefit, but lawmakers need not deem these trusts void as 
against public policy. Cf. supra note 142. 
 144. For a further and fuller discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 142, at 69–84.  
 145. Toobin, supra note 141, at 40. Indeed, any type of “unnatural” estate 
plan could trigger indignation of this sort. 
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emotional responses, these should dissipate rapidly.146 At any 
rate, political theorists have long disputed the legitimacy of 
moral indignation as a social “harm,” especially where (as here) 
few directly witness the offensive transfer.147  
The drafters of the Restatement fail to state in concrete 
terms the nature of their objection to trusts for capricious pur-
poses. Their commentary on the matter is cryptic and conclu-
sory: 
Although one may deal capriciously with one’s own property, self-
interest ordinarily restrains such conduct. In any event, society may 
be properly reluctant to interfere with such a use of property by its 
current owner. Where, however, a former owner has attempted to [do 
so,] . . . it is contrary to sound public policy.148 
The distinction this annotation draws between wasteful 
consumption and capricious trusts is doubtful at best. Assum-
ing the drafters object to the capricious use of property on nor-
mative grounds, then that norm should apply equally to per-
sonal use or use through an intermediary trustee. In 
consequential terms, each is equally objectionable or unobjec-
tionable, so why should society be more “reluctant to interfere” 
with the one than with the other?149 Self-interest will operate 
as a natural restraint on conduct to exactly the same extent, 
whether an owner spends a sum of money or hands it over to a 
trustee to spend. Possibly, by a “former”150 owner, the drafters 
mean to refer to a dead owner, which is our focus in any case. 
In this context, self-interest is not quite equally implicated, be-
cause once they die owners no longer need to provide for them-
selves; the removal of this concern frees them to squander 
wealth. Yet, even so, their propensity to squander is unlikely to 
rise on that account. Although spared from personal expenses, 
the dead still face opportunity costs. Every dollar a decedent 
 
 146. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Making Sense: The Causes of Emotional 
Evanescence, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 209, 209–10 
(Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (reporting studies demonstrat-
ing the transience of emotional reactions). 
 147. For a summary of the debate and further references, see TREBILCOCK, 
supra note 35, at 61–64. 
 148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (2003); see also id. § 29 
cmt. m. For references to judicial discussions, see Hirsch, supra note 142, at 
73–74. 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 148. Lawmakers could regulate 
wasteful consumption via the tax system if they were disposed to do so. For a 
further discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 142, at 79–80.  
 150. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
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wastes is a dollar he or she could devote to loved ones, or to 
purposes that truly mattered to him or her.151  
Perhaps, though, the drafters’ assertion of public policy al-
so follows from an implicit assessment of capricious estate 
planning in light of the economic aims of freedom of testation. 
Lawmakers grant freedom of testation, inter alia, because it 
reinforces testators’ incentives to produce and save. But 
when—or to the extent—a testator cares so little about estate 
planning that he or she would throw away the opportunity to 
make meaningful bequests, by hypothesis, the testator’s indif-
ference suggests that freedom of testation will have little im-
pact on his or her economic proclivities.  
If this is the policy behind the capricious purpose doctrine, 
then lawmakers are again applying it inconsistently. A testator 
remains free to select his or her beneficiaries carelessly. These 
occasionally resemble lottery winners, showing up in wills out 
of the blue—as when a testator bequeaths to a favorite enter-
tainer,152 a favorite politician,153 a favorite student,154 a favorite 
waitress,155 a favorite paperboy,156 or a litigant who had once 
tried his case before the testator, sitting as a judge.157 In choos-
ing beneficiaries, at least, a testator can make an estate plan 
“as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, 
[or] revenge can dictate.”158  
 
 151. Even the reclusive Leona Helmsley left the bulk of her estate to rela-
tives and charity. Toobin, supra note 141, at 38. 
 152. Fan Death Wish? A Richer Bronson, CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 25, 1999, 
at A22, available at 1999 WLNR 972899 (remarking bequest of an entire es-
tate of nearly $300,000 to the screen actor, Charles Bronson). 
 153. Eileen Keerdoja et al., Living Well Is the Best Revenge, NEWSWEEK, 
May 23, 1983, at 12 (remarking bequest of $200,000 to Senator, and one-time 
presidential candidate, George McGovern). 
 154. Karen Houppert, A Room of Her Own, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2009, at 
W44 (Magazine), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/10/23/AR2009102302144.html (reporting $75,000 life insurance 
policy that named as beneficiary a student who had taken several classes with 
the insured twenty years earlier, and who had had only occasional contact 
with her since, to the bewilderment of the beneficiary).  
 155. Cranky Patron Leaves $50K, Car to Waitress, CINCINNATI POST, Dec. 
29, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 25674180.  
 156. Customer Leaves $50,000 to His Former Paperboy, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, June 29, 1998, at A6, available at 1998 WLNR 6660036.  
 157. The testator felt he had judged the case poorly and limited the bequest 
to the litigant’s court costs. DAVID PANNICK, JUDGES 2 (1987). 
 158. Schneider v. Vosburgh, 106 N.W. 1129, 1130 (Mich. 1906). “Heirs law-
fully may be disinherited for no reason.” In re Estate of Koch, 849 P.2d 977, 
992 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). 
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At any rate, we ought not be too quick to assume that ca-
pricious purposes or arbitrary distributions signal indifference 
to estate planning. Seemingly wasteful bequests could find 
their logic—and utility—in the statements they make, allowing 
a testator to influence how he or she is remembered.159 Out-
sized bequests for the care of pet animals may also signify emo-
tional attachments comparable to ones that more commonly tie 
testators to human beneficiaries.160 It also bears noting that 
testators must possess testamentary capacity before they can 
exercise freedom of testation, and one element of capacity is the 
ability to recognize the natural objects of one’s bounty.161 In 
other words, testators cannot make any estate plan unless they 
retain the mental wherewithal to appreciate the opportunity 
costs that lend gravity to seemingly wasteful or arbitrary be-
quests. 
Finally, and importantly for present purposes, the capri-
cious-purpose doctrine conflicts with contracts doctrine, where 
one discovers no equivalent limitation. A contracting party re-
mains perfectly free to enter into an agreement for the purpose 
of pursuing what inheritance law would brand as capricious 
ends. Of course, service contracts typically are paid for and per-
formed during life—yet they need not be. Leona Helmsley could 
have negotiated an executory contract with an individual or 
company to wait on Trouble paw and paw, requiring payment 
and performance only upon death, in which case the service 
provider would have comprised a contract creditor with a claim 
against Helmsley’s estate. Such a contract would remain invul-
nerable to challenge by beneficiaries or heirs on grounds of ca-
priciousness (although they could seek to negotiate an accord 
with the service provider to terminate the contract).162 If indi-
 
 159. For a fuller discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 142, at 75–78. 
 160. Helmsley “treated [her dog Trouble] like a person, and took her every-
where. She would take that dog to bed with her every night.” Toobin, supra 
note 141, at 40 (quoting a business acquaintance of Helmsley) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  
 161. Alternative beneficiaries have sometimes challenged testamentary 
capacity, often successfully, when presented with capricious estate plans. 
Hirsch, supra note 142, at 81 nn.179–81. An announced challenge to the 
Helmsley will resulted in a pretrial settlement. Toobin, supra note 141, at 39. 
For a further discussion asserting an apparent contradiction between the ca-
pricious purpose doctrine and the sound mind doctrine, see Hirsch, supra note 
142, at 80–83.  
 162. For a recognition that a contract can play the same role as an honor-
ary trust, without comparing their doctrinal attributes, see Ronald C. Link & 
Kimberly A. Licata, Perpetuities Reform in North Carolina: The Uniform Stat-
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viduals can fashion a contract to suit their purposes, then the 
law’s refusal to give effect to a bequest for the same purposes is 
dubious or even, we might say, a bit capricious. 
IV.  COMPULSORY BEQUESTS   
The antithesis of a forbidden bequest is a compulsory be-
quest.163 Lawmakers could require individuals to distribute 
portions of their estates to particular beneficiaries. Carried to 
the extreme, such mandates would function to abolish freedom 
of testation. Carried less far, a legal system can combine specif-
ic compulsory bequests with residual freedom of testation. Once 
again, contract law affords an analogy in the form of so-called 
compulsory contracts—that is, the mandatory offers of services 
at fixed tariffs that public utilities and other common carriers 
have had to make to ordinary citizens.164 
Obviously, compulsory bequests encroach upon a testator’s 
liberty more aggressively than forbidden bequests. A testator 
faced with a prohibition on a preferred estate plan can substi-
tute the next best alternative. Compulsory bequests form a part 
of the estate plan no matter how much the testator loathes the 
idea. Lawmakers might again cite spillover costs to justify 
compulsory bequests. To do so, however, lawmakers must have 
reason to conclude that failure to make a bequest would prove 
more costly to third parties—or to the state—than the cost of 
the bequest itself, thereby creating inefficiency. Lawmakers 
might also point to a second justification for compulsory be-
quests that we have not encountered up to now. Precisely be-
cause compulsory bequests impose themselves more intrusively 
than forbidden ones, a welfarist or “liberal” state could wield 
them to achieve objectives of distributive justice. 
 
utory Rule Against Perpetuities, Nondonative Transfers, and Honorary Trusts, 
74 N.C. L. REV. 1783, 1837 (1996); see also Hirsch, supra note 143, at 946 
n.147. For cases, see, for example, French v. Kensico Cemetery, 30 N.Y.S.2d 
737, 737–38 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (contracting for care of a grave); Kahlmeyer v. 
Green-Wood Cemetery, 23 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (same); Sarah v. 
Primarily Primates, Inc., 255 S.W.3d 132, 143–46 (Tex. App. 2008) (contract-
ing for care of animals held not to create a trust). On the doctrine of accord 
and satisfaction, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 (1981). Bi-
lateral monopoly problems might tend to hamper such an accord.  
 163. Although an oxymoron, the expression “compulsory bequest” is 
adopted here in preference to the wordier, but more accurate, “compulsory un-
compensated transfer upon death.”  
 164. Todd D. Rakoff, Is “Freedom from Contract” Necessarily a Libertarian 
Freedom?, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 477, 478. In recent decades, deregulation has 
done away with most compulsory contracts in the United States. 
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As earlier noted, distributive considerations appear to have 
inspired certain compulsory rules within contract law, a move 
Dean Anthony Kronman has defended.165 Under Dean Kron-
man’s analysis, though, a redistributive rule of contract accords 
with liberal political theory only if it meets certain conditions: 
it must redistribute wealth according to some accepted crite-
rion of fairness, it must achieve the agreed theoretical goal in 
practice, and it must do so more efficiently than alternative le-
gal avenues to the same goal, such as taxation.166 No reason 
appears to assess a redistributive rule of testation according to 
a different standard. 
Historically, lawmakers in the United States and else-
where have contemplated two sorts of compulsory bequests, al-
though their functionality for purposes of achieving either effi-
ciency or distributive justice is hardly manifest.  
A. SPOUSAL SHARES 
American lawmakers accord spouses inheritance rights 
that have varied over time. The primary and predominant right 
today is the “elective share,” also commonly known as the 
“forced share,” whereby a surviving spouse can claim a speci-
fied fraction of the net probate estate, real and personal, of the 
decedent spouse, as an alternative to the sum bequeathed to 
the survivor under the decedent’s will. The right is set by stat-
ute and varies in its details from state to state.167 
In analyzing the elective share conceptually, it is helpful to 
consider that the right arises only in consequence of a couple’s 
decision to embark upon a relationship that is itself often de-
scribed as contractual in nature—their exchange of vows both 
solemnizes and symbolizes a meeting of the minds. Couples 
remain free to waive many of the terms of the “marital con-
 
 165. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 166. Kronman, supra note 42, at 498, 507–08. 
 167. For an overview, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND 
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 9 (2003). Instead of the elective share, nine 
states (with variations) accord immediate and reciprocal rights to both spouses 
in half the property earned by each during the marriage. This system of mar-
ital property law (as opposed to inheritance law) is known as community prop-
erty. Uniquely in the United States, one jurisdiction (Georgia) grants no right 
of either sort to spouses (although they do receive a one-year support allow-
ance). For a state-by-state survey, see ROBERT B. JOSLYN, SURVIVING 
SPOUSE’S RIGHTS TO SHARE IN DECEASED SPOUSE’S ESTATE (2004), available 
at http://www.actec.org/resources/publications/studies/Study10.pdf.  
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tract,”168 rendering marital rights at least partly mutable.169 To 
the extent that it determines rights of inheritance, the marital 
contract is also a kind of contract to make a will.170 Accordingly, 
the problems of freedom of contract and freedom of testation 
come together at this juncture. If couples have freedom to forgo 
the elective share as a term in the marital contract, they will 
also gain greater freedom of testation.171 If they lack the first, 
then they will also lose the second. 
Under American law, couples do enjoy freedom to modify 
inheritance rights via prenuptial agreements.172 The elective 
share therefore operates as a default rule under contract law 
and does not wholly confine freedom of testation.173 This need 
not be so, and it is not so under British law, for example, which 
 
 168. This term has come into common use in the literature. E.g., Lloyd R. 
Cohen, Marriage: The Long-Term Contract, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 10 passim (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 
2002); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 
84 VA. L. REV. 1225 passim (1998). For an early discussion, see Ditson v. Dit-
son, 4 R.I. 87, 101–02 (1856) (rejecting this characterization).  
 169. Although commentators observe a trend in the direction of greater 
freedom to modify the marital contract, that freedom remains far from abso-
lute—many of its terms do remain compulsory in the United States. Jill Elaine 
Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 834–42 (2004). 
 170. For a further discussion of this hybrid category, see Hirsch, supra note 
2, at 1078–82. 
 171. Testators will still lack complete freedom of testation unless they can 
unilaterally avoid the elective share. Although unilateral strategies for avoid-
ing the elective share do exist under current law, they involve uncertainty, in-
convenience, and expense. For discussions, see Jeffrey N. Pennell, Minimizing 
the Surviving Spouse’s Elective Share, 32 INST. ON EST. PLAN. ¶ 9, at 1, 19–47 
(1998); Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My Property 
to Whomever I Choose at My Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Start Loving the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 781–87 (2006). 
 172. For an early example, see Naill v. Maurer, 25 Md. 532, 538–40 (1866). 
Accord Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W. 522, 525 (Ky. 1916) (distinguishing pre-
nuptial agreements concerning rights at death from rights upon divorce, the 
first being valid and the second—at that time—invalid). For modern doctrine, 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 9.4 (2003); Stephen R. Pitcher, Waiver of Spousal Rights in Estate of De-
ceased Spouse, 7 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 443 passim (1975). A prospective 
spouse who would prefer a prenuptial agreement may nevertheless hesitate to 
request one, because of the signals it would send to the other party. 
MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 39 (2000); Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the Rules of 
Marital Property Be Normative?, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 274. Even so, 
these agreements have become increasingly common. Allison A. Marston, 
Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 887, 891 (1997).  
 173. For a recognition, see Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Mar-
riage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1233, 1243. 
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disallows couples from overriding by contract spousal inherit-
ance rights.174 
In assessing the elective share, then, we have several is-
sues before us. Should lawmakers allow couples contractually 
to avoid the elective share? Assuming so, what form (if any) 
should the elective share take? And assuming not, what form 
should it take? Analysis in light of the articulated rationales for 
spousal-inheritance rights suggests that lawmakers have poor-
ly coordinated the elective share in its contractual domain with 
the elective share in its testamentary domain—a disconnection 
that could again trace to the traditional separation of the law of 
contracts from the law of wills. 
One historical rationale for the elective share is that it op-
erates “to ensure that the surviving spouse has continuing fi-
nancial support after the death” of the other spouse.175 In want 
of such support, the surviving spouse would have to turn to the 
state as benefactor of last resort. Translated into the vernacu-
lar of economics, the absence of an elective share would produce 
spillover costs. 
This rationale corresponds with and justifies the prevailing 
nonreciprocal structure of the elective share, which protects on-
ly the surviving spouse. Under elective-share doctrine, a dece-
dent spouse cannot bequeath any portion of the survivor’s 
property, a qualification that makes sense when the objective is 
to avoid impoverishment. Decedents have no need for financial 
support. 
At the same time, an elective share tailored to avoid spill-
over costs would require a more refined calculation of the size 
of the share than current law stipulates. With this end in view, 
lawmakers should match the elective share with the amount 
necessary to render a surviving spouse ineligible for public as-
sistance. The Uniform Probate Code responds to this concern 
 
 174. Stewart Leech, “With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow”? The Sta-
tus of Prenuptial Agreements in England and Wales, 34 FAM. L.Q. 193 passim 
(2000). 
 175. Mongold v. Mayle, 452 S.E.2d 444, 447 (W. Va. 1994). As the quotation 
intimates, the elective share extends in this respect spouses’ responsibilities to 
provide for each other’s essential expenses while both are alive and still mar-
ried, whether they are living together or separated. For a discussion of the liv-
ing support obligation, see HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 7.1, 7.3–.4 (2d ed. 1987). For like com-
mentary on the purpose of the elective share, see, for example, In re Estate of 
Amundson, 621 N.W.2d 882, 886–87 (S.D. 2001); UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2, 
pt. 2, gen. cmt. (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 67 (Supp. 2010). 
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via rough approximation on the downside, by setting a mini-
mum dollar amount for the elective share that supplements its 
fractional amount for smaller decedents’ estates.176 The Code 
nevertheless fails to take account of the absence of spillover 
costs on the upside, setting no maximum amount for the elec-
tive share.177 
What is more, hardly any lawmakers have addressed the 
problem of spillover costs in connection with freedom to con-
tract around the elective share. Yet, this concern has not es-
caped attention in other contexts. Under the Uniform Premar-
ital Agreement Act, a party can avoid a prenuptial agreement 
that would cause him or her “to be eligible for support under a 
program of public assistance,” in the wake of divorce.178 Inex-
plicably, and perhaps accidentally, the Act fails to extend this 
caveat to prenuptial agreements that take effect in the wake of 
death.179 Likewise, after rehearsing the support rationale for 
the elective share, and after adjusting the (downside) amount 
of the elective share with this rationale in mind, the drafters of 
the Uniform Probate Code saw fit to allow a prenuptial agree-
 
 176. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(b) (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 76 
(Supp. 2010). This provision “implements the support theory.” Id. § 2-202 cmt.; 
see also id. art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (placing the minimum elective share amount 
in the context of social security and other entitlements). 
 177. The Commissioners are aware that for large estates the elective share 
“may go far beyond the survivor’s needs,” and that it disregards whether or 
not the survivor has “ample independent means.” Id. art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt. 
Nonetheless, the Commissioners recognized these features of the elective 
share as “conventional” and included them in the Uniform Probate Code on 
that basis. Id. 
 178. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b) (1983), 9C U.L.A. 35, 49 
(2001) (adopted by twenty-six states). By the same token, spouses cannot 
waive by prenuptial agreement the doctrines requiring them to provide for 
each other’s necessary expenses while both are alive and they remain married. 
Id. (covering separation); Hasday, supra note 169, at 838–40 (noting the im-
mutability of the doctrine of necessaries, applicable to couples living together).  
 179. Whereas the Act covers prenuptial agreements disposing of property 
“upon separation, marital dissolution, [or] death,” see UNIF. PREMARITAL 
AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(3) (1983), 9C U.L.A. 43 (2001), the provision overriding 
agreements rendering a spouse eligible for public assistance refers only to 
spouses eligible for such assistance “at the time of separation or marital disso-
lution.” Id. § 6(b). By distinguishing death from marital dissolution, section 3 
implies that under the terminology of the Act “marital dissolution” does not 
include termination of a marriage on account of death. See id. § 3(a)(3). Never-
theless, the Act’s prefatory note states that the limitation contained in section 
6 covers spouses rendered eligible for public assistance “at the time of separa-
tion, marital dissolution, or death.” Id. prefatory note (emphasis added). This 
statement suggests that the drafters were confused about the implications of 
their wording of sections 3 and 6. 
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ment to waive the elective share, even to the point of destitu-
tion.180 It would appear the Commissioners contemplated free-
dom of contract and freedom of testation as separate and dis-
tinct problems. Only one state today bars contractual waivers 
of the elective share that impose spillover costs.181 
A second historical justification for the elective share re-
quires a different analysis. Lawmakers and commentators have 
often maintained that the united efforts of spouses cause them 
over time to contribute either directly or indirectly to each oth-
er’s wealth. This implicit economic partnership stands beside 
the explicit aspects of their partnership, entitling them both to 
share in their collective wealth at death.182 
The Uniform Probate Code observes the partnership ration-
ale by varying the amount of the elective share with the dura-
 
 180. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-213 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 129–
31 (1998). The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code fail to explain this deci-
sion, stating only that the Code “incorporates the standards by which the va-
lidity of a prenuptial agreement is determined under the Uniform Premarital 
Agreement Act § 6.” Id. § 2-213 cmt. 
 181. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-07 (2010) (“A surviving spouse’s waiv-
er is not enforceable if the surviving spouse proves that . . . [it] would reduce 
the assets or income available to the surviving spouse to an amount less than 
those allowed for persons eligible for . . . [government] assistance . . . on the 
basis of need.”). 
 182. E.g., In re Estate of Amundson, 621 N.W.2d 882, 887 (S.D. 2001); 
Mongold v. Mayle, 452 S.E.2d 444, 447 (W. Va. 1994); UNIF. PROBATE CODE 
art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 67 (Supp. 2010); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§§ 9.1 cmt. b, 9.2 reporter’s note 2 (2003). Indirect contributions typically (or 
stereotypically) take the form of childcare and other household services per-
formed by one spouse that free up the wage labor of the other spouse. For dis-
cussions, see, for example, POSNER, supra note 98, § 5.1, at 143–46; Katharine 
B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 
65, 92–111 (1998). The fact remains that the marital partnership theory is re-
ductionistic, failing to take account of the variety of circumstances that could 
affect the level of uncompensated contributions from one spouse to the other. 
That contribution could prove greater in a joint business venture held in one 
spouse’s name, see, e.g., In re Honigman’s Will, 168 N.E.2d 676, 677 (N.Y. 
1960), or less if the marriage is a childless one, see Rosenbury, supra note 173, 
at 1287, or greater again if one spouse provided end-of-life care for the other, 
Silbaugh, supra, at 137 (“Elder care in second marriages may be the moral 
equivalent of childcare in first marriages.”); see also Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18–20 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a contract between 
spouses under which one promised to nurse the other, who had suffered a 
stroke, in exchange for a bequest under the disabled spouse’s will was not 
supported by consideration, given the preexisting duty between spouses to 
provide mutual support). 
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tion of the marriage.183 At the same time, the restriction of the 
elective share to the surviving spouse under the Uniform Pro-
bate Code, as is conventional under state law, clashes with this 
rationale. Elective share doctrine gives the first spouse to die 
no right to bequeath any portion of the survivor’s property, al-
though this right should follow from the proposition that the 
wealth of each derived from pooled effort.184 This structural 
feature of the elective share fits only the support rationale and 
seems to repudiate the partnership rationale. 
At any rate, switching to the perspective of contract law, 
the partnership rationale suggests no reason to curtail couples’ 
freedom to waive their inheritance rights in a prenuptial 
agreement. As a general proposition, parties are free to give up 
entitlements to property via contract. Yet, once we fashion the 
elective share as a default rule in contract law, other issues 
 
 183. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 & cmt., 2-203 & cmt. (amended 2008), 8 
pt. 1 U.L.A. 76, 78 (Supp. 2010). In light of the variety of forms and levels of 
marital contributions, see supra note 182, lawmakers could alternatively give 
courts discretion to assign a forced share, as is true under British law. For 
proposals to this effect, see Helene S. Shapo, “A Tale of Two Systems”: Anglo-
American Problems in the Modernization of Inheritance Legislation, 60 TENN. 
L. REV. 707, 732–39, 780–81 (1993); Angela M. Vallario, Spousal Election: 
Suggested Equitable Reform for the Division of Property at Death, 52 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 519 passim (2003). For criticisms of this idea, see Mary Ann Glendon, 
Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 
60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1185–91 (1986); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Wag-
goner, Redesigning the Spouse’s Forced Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
303, 314, 320–21 (1987). For a contracts analogy, see supra note 44 and ac-
companying text. 
 184. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(a)(amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 76 
(Supp. 2010). In addition, a surviving spouse must live long enough to exercise 
a right of election; if, hard on the death of one spouse, the surviving spouse 
dies in turn, his or her personal representative cannot exercise the right in fa-
vor of his or her estate. Id. § 2-212(a) & cmt. In both of these respects, the elec-
tive share differs fundamentally from the community property system. See su-
pra note 167. The drafters claim that the Uniform Probate Code’s redesigned 
elective share suffices “to bring elective-share law into line with the contempo-
rary view of marriage as an economic partnership,” see id. art. 2, pt. 2, gen. 
cmt., but plainly the community property system accomplishes this goal more 
fully. The Commissioners had considered the possibility of a right of election 
exercisable by the estate of the first spouse to die, or by the estate of a surviv-
ing spouse who dies shortly after the first to die, which they recognized was 
“more consistent with the marital partnership theory.” Lawrence W. Waggon-
er, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform 
Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683, 731 n.123 (1992). The Com-
missioners nevertheless rejected the idea because it “would contravene the 
purpose of an elective-share system,” which “states traditionally view as 
. . . personally benefitting the surviving spouse rather than the beneficiaries of 
a spouse’s estate.” Id. at 738 n.146. 
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arise that most commentators on the elective share—fixated on 
its testamentary aspect—have overlooked. Orthodox default 
rule theory requires that the mutable terms of a contract cor-
respond with the intent of a majority of parties, in the interest 
of minimizing transaction costs.185 The question then becomes 
whether most couples drafting a marital contract would prefer 
that it include rights of inheritance and, assuming so, how most 
would prefer to structure those rights. 
That is a matter demanding empirical study, although we 
can speculate about couples’ probable preferences on the basis 
of logical conjecture. The best way to think about the problem is 
to break down the reasons why persons sometimes prefer to 
disinherit their marital partners and then inquire whether 
most couples would have cause to value a forced share vel non, 
despite those reasons. 
One obvious explanation for spousal disinheritance is mar-
ital disharmony. In this connection, spouses might understand-
ably wish the marital contract to include a right to recoup 
wealth owned by the other spouse that they had a hand in 
creating, or even a broader right to share wealth as a means of 
coinsurance against want.186 Still, spouses nowadays are likely 
to terminate a failed marriage prior to death, making property 
rights upon divorce the key component of contractual protec-
tion.187 Given a spouse’s unilateral power to sue for divorce, in-
 
 185. On inheritance default rules, see Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 15. 
For a rare recognition of the potential of spousal inheritance rights to mini-
mize transaction costs, see POSNER, supra note 98, § 18.8, at 550. 
 186. See Rick Geddes & Paul J. Zak, The Rule of One-Third, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 119, 126–30 (2002) (presenting an economic model showing that an effi-
cient division of labor within the family cannot occur unless marital partners 
precommit to provide the childrearing spouse with long-term support); Linda 
J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 498 (1995) (remarking 
the insurance attribute of marriage); supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
To the extent the preference for insurance stands over and above the prefer-
ence to recoup mutual contributions to wealth, the Uniform Probate Code’s 
decision to tie the elective share amount to the duration of the marriage, see 
supra note 183, becomes problematic.  
 187. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS 
COHABITATION, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND REMARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
21–22 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022 
.pdf (“Most separated women make the transition to divorce very quickly: 84 
percent . . . divorce within 3 years, and 91 percent do so within 5 years.”). Bro-
ken down along ethnic lines, the divorce rate five years after separation 
among black, Hispanic, and white women is sixty-seven percent, seventy-
seven percent, and ninety-seven percent, respectively. Id. But cf. Langbein & 
Waggoner, supra note 183, at 313 (observing that within certain religions “di-
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surance against disinheritance becomes largely superfluous. 
Nevertheless, assuming that risk aversion motivates a majority 
of couples to prefer this sort of insurance anyway, the restric-
tion of the elective share to the surviving spouse would lie in 
doubt. If the happenstance of survival determines whether a 
spouse can claim the elective share, then his or her entitlement 
is exposed to greater risk, reducing the usefulness of the elec-
tive share as a form of insurance—not insurance against priva-
tion in this context, but rather as life insurance.188 Empirical 
evidence could still reveal that most spouses prefer to include 
only a right to insurance against lifetime privation, and not life 
insurance, in the marital contract. In that event, the current 
structure of the elective share would correspond with majority 
preferences. Assuming, though, that most spouses also prefer 
to include in the marital contract a right to recoup their implic-
it contributions to the wealth of the other spouse—a right that 
is not logically tied to survival, and hence which spouses should 
prefer to maintain whether or not they are the first to die—
then lawmakers ought to craft an elective share that both 
spouses can claim, but one that is greater for a surviving spouse 
than for a decedent spouse. 
Even when happily married, one spouse might prefer to 
disinherit the other in order to protect the inheritance of his or 
her children from prior relationships, who cannot count on ben-
efitting in turn when the other spouse—from the children’s 
perspective, a stepparent—dies. It is this scenario, in fact, that 
inspires the lion’s share of prenuptial agreements today.189 Un-
der these circumstances, risk aversion might move a spouse 
who lacks independent means to welcome a forced share, espe-
cially given that in the context of a harmonious marriage di-
vorce would comprise an unattractive option. In those instances 
where both spouses have independent means, however, and 
even more so where both have children from prior relationships 
to protect, it is hard to imagine many spouses insisting on a 
 
vorce is not an option”); Pennell, supra note 171, at 13–14 (noting anecdotal 
examples of spouses disinherited while permanently separated). 
 188. By the same token, risk aversion suggests a preference for an elective 
share that the executor of a surviving spouse can exercise. See supra note 184. 
 189. Prenuptial agreements are far more common for second marriages 
than for first ones, where protection of children from prior marriages becomes 
the primary consideration. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 
§ 7.05 cmt. e (2000); Marston, supra note 172, at 891; see also Randall J. Gin-
giss, Second Marriage Considerations for the Elderly, 45 S.D. L. REV. 469, 
473–77 (2000) (noting that prenuptial agreements represent an important 
element in estate planning for remarried testators). 
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forced share. Intriguingly, the elective share laws of a minority 
of jurisdictions already make some allowance for this scenario: 
fourteen states vary the size of the elective share depending on 
whether the decedent spouse left children and, in three of those 
fourteen, depending on whether the surviving spouse was also 
the parent of those children.190  
Ultimately, only empirical inquiry can gauge couples’ 
probable preferences with any degree of authority. Plausible 
analysis in lieu of data suggests only that the correspondence 
between spousal preferences and existing elective-share laws is 
by no means assured. 
Finally, two other critiques of the elective share bear not-
ing, each of which has focused on its contractual dimension. 
Professor Gail Frommer Brod submits that lawmakers ought to 
curtail prenuptial agreements waiving the elective share be-
cause they “contribute to the financial vulnerability of women 
as a class, and . . . magnify society’s unequal distribution of re-
sources along gender lines.”191 Professor Brod here identifies 
robust spousal inheritance rights as an instrument of distribu-
tive justice. 
The persuasiveness of this argument remains questionable. 
Historically, at least, American women in the aggregate have 
owned less than men and thus represent “an already disadvan-
taged socioeconomic class.”192 Reducing this aggregate disad-
 
 190. Rosenbury, supra note 173, at 1253, 1256–58 & n.133. The Uniform 
Probate Code fails to refine the elective share on the basis of whether decedent 
spouses leave children, or children from prior relationships. See UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202 to -203 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 76, 78 (Supp. 
2010). Nevertheless, the drafters intended that by tying the scale of the elec-
tive share to the duration of the marriage, the Code would reduce the elective 
share amount for marriages occurring later in life. Id. art. 2, pt. 2, gen. cmt. 
For a further discussion, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Probate 
Code’s Elective Share: Time for a Reassessment, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 
11–33 (2003).  
 191. Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229, 240 (1994). In prior formulations, this argument 
had been confined to prenuptial agreements modifying rights to property upon 
divorce. Id. at 239 n.46. For a related analysis, see Silbaugh, supra note 182, 
at 122–43. 
 192. Brod, supra note 191, at 241–42, 294. For more recent evidence, see 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 133–36 (1999) (citing to stud-
ies); Dalton Conley & Miriam Ryvicker, The Price of Female Headship: Gen-
der, Inheritance, and Wealth Accumulation in the United States, 13 J. INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION 41 passim (2004); Lena Edlund & Wojciech Kopczuk, Women, 
Wealth, and Mobility, AM. ECON. REV. 146 passim (2009); Richard W. Johnson 
et al., Gender Differences in Pension Wealth and Their Impact on Late-Life In-
equality, 22 ANN. REV. GERONTOLOGY & GERIATRICS 116 (2002); Wojciech 
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vantage promotes gender egalitarianism, an accepted social ob-
jective, even if the imbalance is disappearing rapidly.193 And al-
though on its face the elective share represents a gender-
neutral rule, traditional disparities between spouses’ ages, 
coupled with different life expectancies, conspire to make wives 
likelier on average to survive their husbands, thereby allowing 
more women than men to exercise rights to the elective 
share.194 Hence, its waivability jeopardizes the rights of more 
widows than widowers. 
But who gains as a result? No evidence suggests that male 
testators systematically favor beneficiaries of their own gen-
der.195 Accordingly, freedom to opt out of the elective share pro-
duces no intergenerational gender-based wealth stratification. 
Even with respect to the parties themselves, the matter is far 
from clear. An empirical study of Georgia wills found that 
wives disinherit husbands nearly twice as often as husbands 
disinherit wives.196 If this datum reflects a national pattern, 
then even if fewer men than women stand in a position to claim 
an elective share by virtue of surviving their spouses, more 
surviving men than surviving women have cause to exercise a 
right of election and thus would benefit from its existence as an 
unwaivable right. 
What is more, we have to consider the ex ante conse-
quences of an unwaivable elective share. If lawmakers cur-
tailed prenuptial agreements, some would-be spouses might 
prefer not to marry, even though some of their would-be part-
ners would rather sign away rights under enforceable prenup-
 
Kopczuk & Emmanuel Saez, Top Wealth Shares in the United States, 1916–
2000: Evidence from Estate Tax Returns 13–15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 10399, 2004).  
 193. The latest study finds a dramatic shift of income and wealth toward 
American women in recent decades, which suggests today “gender role rever-
sals in both the spousal characteristics and the economic benefits of marriage.” 
RICHARD FRY & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WOMEN, MEN, AND THE 
NEW ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE 1 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends 
.org/files/2010/11/new-economics-of-marriage.pdf.  
 194. Brod, supra note 191, at 244–45, 249; Rosenbury, supra note 173, at 1232. 
 195. For the most recent empirical study comparing men’s and women’s 
patterns of testation, also citing to earlier studies, see Kristine S. Knaplund, 
The Evolution of Women’s Rights in Inheritance, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 
21–39 (2008).  
 196. Pennell, supra note 171, at 16–18. This study—which appeared after 
Brod published her analysis—harvests data from nine counties featuring dif-
ferent socioeconomic characteristics and hence may suggest broader testamen-
tary patterns. Id. at 8–10.  
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tial agreements than remain unmarried.197 A redistributive tax 
regime could avoid such distortions. Kronman’s condition that 
redistributive contract rules operate more efficiently than al-
ternatives appears unmet in this instance.198 
Professor Melvin Eisenberg offers another critique of 
spousal inheritance rights that again explores their contractual 
element. Professor Eisenberg argues for a restrictive approach 
to waivers of the elective share on the basis of paternalism.199 
Citing empirical evidence that overoptimism bias disposes 
prospective spouses “systematically [to] understate” the risk of 
marital disharmony, and also questioning their ability to antic-
ipate the eventual impact a prenuptial agreement will have, 
given evolving “income[], . . . obligations[, and] . . . personal ex-
pectations,” Eisenberg suggests that waivers of the elective 
share tend to engender subsequent regret.200 Therefore, pre-
nuptial agreements should take effect only where “the parties 
were likely to have had a mature understanding that the 
agreement would apply even in the kind of marriage scenario 
that actually occurred.”201  
Eisenberg’s analysis presupposes the existence of marital 
inheritance rights; he offers no independent justifications for 
those rights. But assuming they do exist, Eisenberg’s paternal-
istic rationale for making inheritance rights unreceptive to con-
tractual modification is troubling. Perhaps as concerns prenup-
 
 197. Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of 
Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 145, 169–70, 204, 207 (1998); Brian H. Bix, The Public and Private Or-
dering of Marriage, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 315–17; Jill Elaine Hasday, 
Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 505 (2005). 
 198. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 199. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Con-
tract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 217–19, 254–58 (1995). Although Professor Eisen-
berg fails to make explicit that paternalism underlies the limits on freedom of 
contract that he advocates, all such limits intended to preempt anticipated er-
rors of judgment rest on a paternalistic foundation. Christine Jolls et al., A Be-
havioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541–43 (1998).  
 200. Eisenberg, supra note 199, at 254. For the empirical study of overop-
timism bias toward marital success cited by Eisenberg, see Lynn A. Baker & 
Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and 
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 
(1993). For a subsequent study reporting equivalent findings, see Heather 
Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? 7–10, 15–16 (Harvard 
Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 436, 
2003), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/436; see also PLOUS, supra 
note 115, at 134–35 (discussing overoptimism bias generally). 
 201. Eisenberg, supra note 199, at 258. 
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tial agreements governing rights within a failed marriage, 
where evidence shows systematic overoptimism bias to exist, 
lawmakers have cause to protect adults from unrealistic predic-
tions of marital success. But it is quite enough to do so in the 
context of divorce, the usual endpoint of a failed marriage.202 
By extending paternalism to instances of regretted waivers of 
the elective share within harmonious marriages ending in 
death, where the regret stems from faulty expectations of a 
random nature, we could open the door to paternalistic intru-
sions on the autonomy of contracting adults in countless other 
situations without any clear, limiting principle to cabin the in-
trusions. 
In sum, the case for assigning a compulsory bequest to the 
surviving spouse is convincing only as concerns the narrow 
subset of estates where the absence of a bequest would burden 
the welfare state with spillover costs.203 Excepting that subset, 
lawmakers have no cause to deny couples the right to agree to 
dispense with the elective share, and even no compelling reason 
to assume that they would prefer a more expansive elective 
share as a default rule. And again, we may note the failure of 
most lawmakers and commentators to relate prenuptial agree-
ments as an issue in freedom of contract to the elective share as 
an issue in freedom of testation, despite the interconnection of 
those issues.  
B. FILIAL SHARES 
In most countries, bequests to children are compulsory.204 
Not so in the vast majority of American states, where parents 
remain free to disinherit children, even while they are mi-
nors.205 This power comprises a true instance of American legal 
exceptionalism. 
 
 202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 203. For prior commentary that questions the wisdom of an elective share, 
see Pennell, supra note 171, at 7–16, 48–52; Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse’s 
Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 
passim (1966); Turnipseed, supra note 171. 
 204. Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must 
Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L. REV. 1, 1 & n.3 (1996) (“[P]rovisions protect-
ing children from disinheritance are in place in most modern nations through-
out the world.”); see also Where There’s a Will There’s a Row, ECONOMIST, Oct. 
17, 2009, at 65 (making the same observation within Europe). For ancient law, 
see THE HAMMURABI CODE §§ 150, 168–169 (Chilperic Edwards ed., 1921) 
(Code of Babylonia, c. 2084–2081 B.C.).  
 205. For the minority of states carving out limited exceptions from this 
principle, see infra note 218. 
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We may observe initially that, although the problems of a 
compulsory share for spouse and child are sometimes treated 
together,206 when viewed from a contracts perspective the two 
raise different policy issues. Lawmakers may, or may not, hold 
a surviving spouse to the terms of a prenuptial agreement. No 
comparable “prenatal” agreement ever governs the rights of 
would-be children. Filial rights, then, have to do uniquely with 
freedom of testation, not contract. 
Some commentators posit a moral obligation on the part of 
parents to bequeath portions of their estates to their chil-
dren.207 The theoretical framework developed in this Article of-
fers no insight into the merits of that proposition, at least inso-
far as it draws strength from noneconomic factors—natural 
expectations or some sort of “birthright.” To pursue the matter 
would lead us into deontology. This Article follows a different 
road, and for present purposes we shall assume that no claim to 
a patrimony derives simply from the fact of birth. 
Granting parents leeway to vary or deny bequests to chil-
dren produces economic benefits of the sort that freedom of tes-
tation ideally achieves. This leeway enables a parent to fine-
tune bequests to children in order to enhance their individual 
and collective welfare—an outcome that parents’ familiarity 
with, and attachment to, their children helps to ensure.208 And 
this leeway also enables parents to extract preferred behaviors 
from children.209 Disinheritance has long rounded out the ar-
 
 206. E.g., LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 20–31 
(1955); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 83 passim (1994). 
 207. See, e.g., Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to Be Born: The American 
Law of Disinheritance and a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected In-
heritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1222–25 (1990); Ronald Chester, Disinherit-
ance and the American Child: An Alternative from British Columbia, 1998 
UTAH L. REV. 1, 5–6. For assertions of children’s more limited moral claim to 
economic support during their minority, see, for example, ANNE L. ALSTOTT, 
NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES 
PARENTS 33–47 (2004); Brashier, supra note 204, at 5–6, 23. For an early dis-
cussion, see 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. 2, 
ch. 2, § 3, at 284–86 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1895) (1848) (“I cannot 
admit that [a parent] owes to his children, merely because they are his chil-
dren, to leave them rich . . . .”). See also Frances H. Foster, Linking Support 
and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199, 1207–17 
(summarizing the debate over filial inheritance rights). 
 208. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The core idea is centuries 
old. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 10. Legislators explicitly justified the ab-
olition of forced heirship for children in Texas in 1856 as necessary “to restore 
to parents that control over their children, which the present law has . . . com-
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senal of threats a parent can aim at a wayward child—as Paris 
Hilton is now discovering.210 By the same token, a parent can 
augment bequests as an encouragement to dutiful children. 
Compulsory bequests to children would hinder either strategy. 
Of course, the behaviors parents might seek to elicit take 
many forms, but one of them now looms in importance. As Pro-
fessor Joshua Tate has recently argued, rising longevity in the 
United States has heightened the need for end-of-life care giv-
ing, which children may be enlisted to provide.211 New empiri-
cal evidence suggests that parents are increasingly exercising 
freedom of testation to reward supportive children, although 
equal treatment of children remains the norm.212 In fact, we 
can carry Professor Tate’s analysis a step further. Freedom of 
testation allows a testator to favor an unrelated or more dis-
tantly related caregiver over the heads of his or her children 
when they fail to provide care. Doubtless such cases arise rare-
ly, but they are hardly unheard of.213 
 
pletely destroyed.” Joseph W. McKnight, Spanish Legitim in the United 
States—Its Survival and Decline, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 92 (1996) (quoting 
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, 6th Legis., 59–60 (1855)). 
Similarly, Virginia abolished entails in 1776 because they had “render[ed 
children] independent of and disobedient to their parents.” Act of Oct. 1776, 
ch. 26, in 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS 
OF VIRGINIA 226, 226 (William Waller Hening ed., 1821) (preamble). For a psy-
chological discussion, see Gerald Schneiderman, The Will as a Vehicle of Fami-
ly Dynamics, 31 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 662 passim (1986). 
 210. In this instance, it is Paris’s grandfather, Barron Hilton, who has cut 
her out of his will. Rachel Johnson, Heir Today, Gone Tomorrow, SUNDAY 
TIMES (London), Oct. 28, 2007, at 4. Ironically, Paris’s great-grandfather, Con-
rad Hilton, had also intended to disinherit Barron—so perhaps the tree didn’t 
fall far from the apple. Together Again, ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2006, at 58. 
 211. Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 
42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 170–76 (2008). 
 212. Id. at 176–81 (citing to studies). For a recent example of an uneven 
estate plan explicitly prompted by caregiving, see In re Estate of Singer, 920 
N.E.2d 943, 944 (N.Y. 2009). For several earlier examples, see MARVIN B. 
SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 98–100 (1970). For additional 
studies, see Jere R. Behrman & Mark R. Rosenzweig, Parental Allocations to 
Children: New Evidence on Bequest Differences Among Siblings, 86 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 637 passim (2004); Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 15, at 
1086 n.247 (citing to studies); Norton & Van Houtven, supra note 7, at 158–71 
(citing to earlier studies).  
 213. Thus, the late actress and film star Lana Turner, who died in 1995, 
left part of her estate to her daughter—with whom she remained on good 
terms—but she left more to her maid, in whose arms she died. Peter Sheridan, 
Blondes Who Had More Fun, DAILY EXPRESS (U.K.), Sept. 27, 2008, available 
at 2008 WLNR 18725605; Liz Smith, Not the Marrying Kind, NEWSDAY, Feb. 
7, 2000, at A11, available at 2000 WLNR 608013; see also Ian MacKinnon, 
Maid Cleans Up with £2.6m Inheritance, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), July 22, 
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It remains instructive to compare this analysis with its 
analogue in the realm of spousal rights. Commentators cite 
each spouse’s economic contribution to the other, including el-
dercare, as a ground for the elective share and hence for denial 
of freedom of testation.214 On reflection, the problem appears 
double edged. Testamentary liberty allows one either to reward 
or to slight individual service. The alternative of compulsory 
bequests allows one to do neither. Still, we have reason to dis-
tinguish compulsory bequests to spouses and children in this 
respect. Residing together in the family home, marital partners 
share as a matter of course. Typically residing outside a par-
ent’s home, adult children provide eldercare less uniformly; 
recognition of their services requires testamentary flexibility.215 
Notwithstanding this analysis, one potential justification 
for compulsory bequests to children is spillover costs, which 
could arise with regard to minor or disabled children who are 
unable to fend for themselves. The alternative to parental sup-
port then becomes public support. As a matter of law, all juris-
dictions impose on living parents the burden of providing for 
their minor children under most circumstances, and in some 
jurisdictions this legal duty can extend to adult disabled chil-
dren as well.216 Efficiency dictates that the burden likewise fall 
on parents’ estates, at least to the extent necessary to prevent 
children from becoming public charges—a policy that lawmak-
 
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 14574348; Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Benevolent Dis-
inheritance: The Kindest Cut, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1980, at 48, 51; case cited 
infra note 215. 
 214. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 215. If children or other close relatives want to ensure that they receive 
compensation for their efforts, they can insist that the testator agree to a will 
contract guaranteeing their bequest. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Pewthers, 685 So. 2d 
953, 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (where the testator turned to a nephew for 
eldercare after her relationship with her child had deteriorated). A will con-
tract can serve a function equivalent to the elective share in this connection. 
Under a new and unique law in China, children must visit regularly and at-
tend to aged parents; parents can sue a child who ignores them. Editorial, 
Filial Piety as Law, CHINA DAILY (Beijing), Jan. 8, 2011, at 5, available at 
2011 WLNR 418006; Xu Xiaomin, Meet the Parents, or Pay the Price, CHINA 
DAILY (Beijing), Jan. 12, 2011, at 8, available at 2011 WLNR 617781. Under 
such a legal regime, compulsory bequests for children can find justification as 
compensatory transfers. 
 216. CLARK, supra note 175, § 7.2; M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Parent’s 
Obligation to Support Adult Child, 1 A.L.R.2d 910 passim (1948); Noralyn O. 
Harlow, Annotation, Postmajority Disability as Reviving Parental Duty to 
Support Child, 48 A.L.R.4th 919 passim (1986); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, 
Parent’s Obligation to Support Unmarried Minor Child Who Refuses to Live 
with Parent, 98 A.L.R.3d 334 passim (1980).  
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ers have also applied in varying degrees to dependent spouses, 
as earlier remarked.217 In fact, statutes in a number of states 
do oblige parents to bequeath enough to a child for whom they 
are legally responsible to protect the child from penury, al-
though most of the statutes operate only in limited situa-
tions.218 
Beyond efficiency, we could question whether compulsory 
bequests for children would advance the ends of distributive 
justice in a liberal state. If anything, the opposite is true. Mod-
ern empirical evidence shows no sign of gender discrimination 
against children by either fathers or mothers that calls for amel-
ioration.219 More broadly, compulsory bequests for children 
would serve only to reinforce existing inequalities of family 
wealth, passed down from generation to generation. Lawmak-
ers mitigate those inequalities both by taxing estates and by 
enabling testators to disinherit their offspring—especially if 
 
 217. See supra notes 175–81 and accompanying text. 
 218. Under the common law, the parental obligation to support a child 
ends at the death of the parent. E.g., McKamey v. Watkins, 273 N.E.2d 542, 
542 (Ind. 1971). Nevertheless, in four states a decedent parent’s estate must 
provide for any child who would otherwise become a public charge if the par-
ent while alive was obliged to support the child. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3952 (West 
2004 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-213 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 14-09-12 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-14 (2009). In two additional 
states, the amount of support a court can order from the decedent parent’s es-
tate is not limited by the threshold for welfare eligibility. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
arts. 1493–1495 (2000 & Supp. 2011) (entitling children aged twenty-three or 
younger and incapacitated children to a designated fraction of the estate); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125B.130 (LexisNexis 2010) (giving the court discre-
tion to set the amount). Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, support 
decrees attendant to divorce or separation continue to bind the estate of a par-
ent obligated to support the child. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 316(c) 
(amended 1973), 9A pt. 2 U.L.A. 102 (1998). Seven out of the eight states that 
adopted the Act include this provision. See id. at 103. For additional judicial 
decisions, see Susan L. Thomas, Annotation, Death of Obligor Parent as Affect-
ing Decree for Support of Child, 14 A.L.R.5th 557 passim (1993). Under non-
Uniform legislation in one other state, support orders stemming from filiation 
proceedings continue to bind the decedent parent’s estate, see IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 7-1107 (2010), while another state applies the same principle to child 
support orders of all sorts, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-11-51 (2010). See Benson ex rel. 
Patterson v. Patterson, 782 A.2d 553, 556–57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (question-
ing in dicta the constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause of testa-
mentary protection for children following divorce, but not for children within 
“intact families”). 
 219. CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA 202–03 (1987); 
Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at 
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 319, 368–70; Knaplund, supra note 195, at 21–39. For historical pat-
terns, see SHAMMAS ET AL., supra, at 42–47, 55–57, 108–12.  
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they prefer to bequeath to charity (as some of America’s wealth-
iest do).220 
In short, economic analysis vindicates Americans’ existing, 
albeit distinctive, liberty to disinherit children, apart from 
those who lie on the doorstep of the welfare state. Although not 
dependent on broader amalgamation with freedom of contract 
for conceptual support, this deduction echoes verdicts reached 
in other parts of this Article that are. The overall judgment re-
mains that freedom of testation merits confinement only in ex-
traordinary circumstances. 
V.  FUTURE INTERESTS   
Some testators execute wills dictating the distribution of 
property not only immediately, but on into the future. In two 
ways, lawmakers restrict such “dead-hand” control. The rule 
against perpetuities limits the duration of testamentary direc-
tives.221 This rule has eroded of late as applied to future inter-
ests held in trust.222 Other rules, also concerning future inter-
ests held in trust, allow a court to modify trust terms in light of 
changing circumstances. These rules have gained strength of 
late.223 Is either sort of limitation defensible? 
 
 220. See infra note 285. 
 221. Strictly speaking, the rule against perpetuities confines contingent 
interests and is just one of three operative doctrines regulating the longevity 
of future interests. A second doctrine confines the duration of honorary trusts 
and a third one confines accumulations. Hirsch, supra note 143, at 930–50; 
Robert H. Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 501 passim (2006). 
 222. By statute, some twenty-eight states have now curtailed the rule 
against perpetuities, either by permitting perpetual trusts (nineteen states) or 
long-lasting trusts (nine states, with durational limits ranging between 150 
and 1000 years). In three states (Arizona, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania), the 
statutes curtailing the rule also allow perpetual future interests out of trust. 
Many of the relevant statutes are noted in 2 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 65, 
§ 9.3.9, at 498–506; for the most recently enacted statute, see KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 381.224 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010) (effective July 15, 2010). This 
legislative trend at the state level is being driven by competitive pressure to 
attract trust business from testators minded to avoid generation-skipping 
transfer taxes at the federal level. Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The 
Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1311–16 (2003); Max M. 
Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise 
of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465 passim (2006). For a recent 
discussion and criticism of the trend, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27, intro. note, at 122–29 (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 6, 2010) (approved May 2010).  
 223. See infra notes 233–39 and accompanying text. 
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The problem of temporal boundaries on future interests is 
a large subject that defies easy summary. A collaborator and I 
have addressed the problem in economic terms at greater 
length elsewhere.224 To put the matter briefly: several of the 
traditional justifications for freedom of testation lose their force 
as the testator extends his or her grip over property into the fu-
ture. Testators cannot trade bequests for services performed by 
a circle of relatives who remain unborn. By the time they come 
into being, those relatives stand in no position to reciprocate.225 
Nor does the notion that freedom of testation results in better 
estate planning226 hold up when a testator ventures to create 
future interests. When providing for existing family members, 
a testator brings to the estate-planning process a depth of 
knowledge gleaned from a lifetime of interaction with them. 
But the same temporal horizon that obstructs tacit bargains 
between a testator and future generations clouds his or her 
ability to see—and hence to see to—their needs. Estate plan-
ning for future generations is better delayed until those needs 
materialize. 
At the same time, a third traditional justification for free-
dom of testation—namely, that it spurs testators to produce 
and save227—continues to apply to future interests. The longer 
freedom of testation persists, the greater testators’ incentives 
to accumulate wealth.228 But further extensions of this freedom 
 
 224. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5. For another recent exploration of the 
subject, see Eric Rakowski, The Future Reach of the Disembodied Will, 4 POL., 
PHIL. & ECON. 91 passim (2005). 
 225. BOULDING, supra note 5, at 97 (“Making sacrifices for a distant poster-
ity is clearly the purest form of [gratuity] that can be imagined, for there can 
be no vestige of exchange in it.”). On bequests to living persons as a form of 
quasi-exchange, see supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.  
 226. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 228. Tax incentives aside, a testator’s appetite for extending dead-hand 
control may be psychological in nature. Lord Kames observed long ago: 
The man who has amassed great wealth, cannnot [sic] think of quit-
ting his hold, and yet, alas! [H]e must die and leave the enjoyment to 
others. To colour a dismal prospect, he makes a deed . . . securing his 
estate . . . to those who represent him, in an endless train of succes-
sion. His estate and his heirs must for ever bear his name; [the] very 
thing to perpetuate his memory and his wealth. 
HENRY HOME (LORD KAMES), HISTORICAL LAW-TRACTS 142 (A. Kincaid ed., 2d 
ed. 1761) (photo. reprint 2000). Similarly, Lord Hobhouse opined that dead-
hand control “is commonly exercised to its fullest extent, merely because it ex-
ists, and without the slightest reason beyond the pleasure of exercising pow-
er.” ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 183 (Chatto & Windus 1880). For a 
modern psychological explanation of the craving for “symbolic immortality,” 
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should yield diminishing marginal utility, given the testator’s 
attenuated connection with the unborn, coupled with the uni-
versal tendency to discount future benefits.229 
Meanwhile, extended dead-hand control can also entail in-
efficiency, although the matter will vary depending on the form 
of control that the testator exerts. As earlier discussed,230 costly 
conditions attached to present bequests cause no loss of effi-
ciency, because the beneficiary can always choose to forfeit the 
bequest if its cost exceeds its benefit. But if a testator elects to 
restrict the use of property into the future, or attaches a condi-
tion that continues to apply to each succeeding owner of an in-
terest in property, then later owners have no way to rid the in-
terest of the restriction. Its costs will mount as they are borne 
again and again, and perhaps also mount by virtue of changing 
times. At some point, the marginal benefit to the testator of 
continued control must equal the marginal cost of the restric-
tion. Theoretically, that is the efficient boundary on dead-hand 
control, and the trend lines suggest that it must exist some-
where. 
The case for confining the dead hand is less easy when the 
testator merely allocates ownership of property over time. Its 
efficient use is then unaffected, although the testator’s deci-
sions necessarily become arbitrary beyond the horizon of his or 
her vision. That is not strictly an economic concern, although 
arbitrariness remains a welfarist concern.231 There appears lit-
 
see Jamie Arndt et al., Terror Management and Self-Awareness: Evidence that 
Mortality Salience Provokes Avoidance of the Self-Focused State, 24 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1216, 1217 (1998).  
 229. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 21. For an early recognition, see 1 
MILL, supra note 207, bk. 2, ch. 2, § 4, at 287–88. 
 230. See supra text following note 73. 
 231. For a further discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 34–38. 
By limiting future interests to lives the testator has known (the “measuring 
lives” of the rule against perpetuities, which must be lives in being when the 
interest is created, although anomalously they may include lives “extraneous” 
to the interest), the rule seeks to ensure that allocations are informed by tes-
tators’ insights into their beneficiaries. Adam Smith considered this the ideal 
cut-off: “The best rule seems to be that we should permit the dying person to 
dispose of his goods as far as he sees, that is, to settle how it shall be divided 
amongst those who are alive at the same time with him.” ADAM SMITH, 
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 70 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 1978) (ms. 1762–
1766). Lord Hobhouse agreed: 
A clear obvious natural line is drawn for us between those persons 
and events which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he 
cannot know or see. Within the former province we may trust his 
natural affections and his capacity of judgment to make better dispo-
sitions than any external Law is likely to make for him. Within the 
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tle reason to confine the dead hand, however, when the testator 
fails even to dictate allocations, but instead creates a discretion-
ary trust, whose allocations remain flexibly in the hands of a 
living trustee. In that event, the dead hand applies its lightest 
touch, resulting in neither inefficient use nor arbitrary alloca-
tion of property over time.232  
The second means whereby lawmakers restrain the dead 
hand is by granting courts power to modify estate plans over 
time. Historically, judicial powers of trust modification were 
narrowly confined. Under the cy pres doctrine, courts could 
modify only charitable trusts, and then only if the original 
terms of the trust became impossible or impractical (not merely 
inconvenient) to implement, only if the estate plan suggested 
that the testator would prefer modification to termination of 
the trust on the ground of impossibility, and only by substitut-
ing terms as near as possible to the original ones.233 
Lawmakers have progressively relaxed these restrictions, 
thereby enhancing judicial power over future interests. The 
rule that the trust purpose as modified must stray from the 
original purpose as little as possible appeared in the first Re-
statement of Trusts but was watered down in the second.234 
The third Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code also widen 
the range of circumstances potentially triggering invocation of 
the cy pres doctrine to include impossibility, impracticality, and 
wastefulness.235 In addition, the Uniform Trust Code (but not 
the Restatement) makes invocation of the doctrine mandatory 
more than twenty-one years after a charitable trust’s creation, 
even if the testator expressed an intent that the trust termi-
nate when its original purpose becomes impossible to carry 
 
latter, natural affection does not extend, and the wisest judgment is 
constantly baffled by the course of events.  
HOBHOUSE, supra note 228, at 188. For an argument that the range of a testa-
tor’s vision differs with regard to trusts for charitable and noncharitable pur-
poses, as opposed to trusts for the benefit of individuals, see Hirsch, supra 
note 142, at 84–91. 
 232. For a fuller discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 38–49. 
 233. For the state of the doctrine circa 1935, see RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS 
§ 399 & cmts. (1935). 
 234. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. c (1935), with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmts. b, d (1959). See also UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 413(a)(3) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006) (following the 
second Restatement); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d (2003) 
(same). 
 235. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003); see also supra notes 142–43. 
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out.236 Finally, and most revolutionary of all, both the Uniform 
Trust Code and the third Restatement create a power to modify 
the substantive terms of all trusts, not just charitable ones, 
where modification will “further the purposes of the trust,” in 
light of “circumstances not anticipated by the settlor,” and in 
line with his or her “probable intention.”237 Despite the last 
stricture, the Uniform Trust Code declares this new doctrine a 
mandatory rule.238 The third Restatement goes a step farther, 
allowing a court to override the substantive terms of any trust 
when all the beneficiaries agree, even if circumstances remain 
unchanged, if the court “determines that the reason(s) for 
. . . modification outweigh the material purpose” of the trust.239 
What, then, of this second, emerging restraint on the free-
dom to dictate future interests, pertaining to their inflexibility, 
as opposed to their duration—is it, too, defensible? Scholars 
have, in fact, connected the two issues, linking the rise of trust 
modification powers to the simultaneous decline of durational 
limits on future interests. Professor David English, reporter for 
the Uniform Trust Code, remarks that “the increasing use in 
recent years of long-term trusts” has created “a need for greater 
 
 236. Compare UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 
(2006), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003). Both the Code and 
the Restatement create a presumption in favor of intent to apply cy pres, in 
any event. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b) cmt. (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 509–10 
(2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003). 
 237. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 507 (2006). 
The Restatement contains equivalent language. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 66(1) & cmt. a (2003). For non-Uniform legislation, see 5 SCOTT ET 
AL., supra note 65, § 33.4, at 2182–86. The antecedent rule of equitable devia-
tion was limited to a power to modify the administrative terms of a trust. 2A 
SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 137, § 167, at 270. In light of this provision, 
which also applies to charitable trusts, Professor Ronald Chester questions 
whether the Code’s cy pres provision has any continuing, independent rele-
vance, apart from its mandatory operation after twenty-one years. Ronald 
Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uni-
form Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 
701–03, 707–09 (2001); see also RONALD CHESTER, FROM HERE TO ETERNITY? 
PROPERTY AND THE DEAD HAND 47–50, 60–63 (2007). Arguably, though, the 
Code’s version of equitable deviation, which allows substantive modification to 
“further” trust purposes, operates more narrowly than cy pres, which allows 
modification of the purpose itself. Compare UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) 
(amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 507 (2006), with id. § 413(a).  
 238. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428 (2006). 
 239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 & cmts. a, d (2003). By con-
trast, under the analogous provision in the Uniform Trust Code allowing the 
court to modify a trust with the consent of all beneficiaries, the court cannot 
disregard a “material purpose of the trust.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(b) 
(amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 498 (2006).  
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flexibility in the restrictive rules that apply concerning when a 
trust may be . . . modified.”240 
Well, yes and no. To the modest extent it addresses the du-
ration of future interests, the Uniform Trust Code does not it-
self empower a testator radically to prolong them, as statutes 
in some states have done.241 Those states are competing for 
trust business,242 and if legislators feel pressure to enhance tes-
tamentary power with respect to the duration of dead-hand 
control, then as a practical matter they may shy away from 
other restrictions on the dead hand that might make their ju-
risdiction comparatively less attractive as a trust situs.243 
At the same time, as a policy matter, judicial power to 
modify future interests eases their prolongation, because then 
they will bend with, not stubbornly defy, evolving facts. In this 
sense, a power of modification can substitute for limits on dura-
tion.244 Still, we make up for extensions of those limits by add-
ing powers of modification that operate beyond the point where 
the old limits stood. To install powers of modification that take 
effect immediately when an interest commences is to curtail 
temporal freedom of testation. We may discover reasons for 
such a retrenchment, but they do not lie in the newfangled 
power to create far-future interests. 
In pursuit of those reasons, we may again find the con-
tracts analogy instructive. Recall Judge Richard Posner’s cri-
 
 240. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provi-
sions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 169 (2002). For like observations, 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 13, introductory note (2003); 
CHESTER, supra note 237, at 56; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 121–22 (2009); 5 
SCOTT ET AL., supra note 65, § 33.6, at 2200–21. 
 241. The Uniform Trust Code only addresses the duration of noncharitable-
purpose trusts, not trusts for individual beneficiaries. As for noncharitable-
purpose trusts, the Code establishes limits on their duration that eleven states 
(including Delaware) have extended. Hirsch, supra note 138, at 16, 18 & n.55. 
Nor does the more general Uniform Act applicable to future interests funda-
mentally widen the reach of the dead hand. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, 
pt. 9, subpt. 1, gen. cmt., § 2-901 (amended 2008), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 223, 226 
(1998) (suggesting that the Uniform Act serves to simplify the law rather than 
to modify the dead hand’s “traditional boundaries”). 
 242. See supra note 222. The competition is occurring within the context of 
manifold trust doctrines, not merely the law of future interests, and Delaware 
is leading the way. Hirsch, supra note 138, at 13–14.  
 243. It comes as no surprise that Delaware has adopted neither the Uni-
form Trust Code nor a mandatory rule of trust modification. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3303, 3541(b) (2007).  
 244. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 222, at 1327–31, 1339–41; Hirsch & 
Wang, supra note 5, at 50–51. 
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tique of marital conditions, quoted earlier in Part II.245 His ra-
tionale for overriding them is that beneficiaries lack the oppor-
tunity to remonstrate with the late testator, to convince him or 
her to waive the condition—“recontracting” is Judge Posner’s 
phrase—as time goes by.246 To put the analogy more technical-
ly: if events dictate, parties can modify a contract by mutual 
consent.247 But in respect of testamentary marital conditions, 
modification by consent becomes impossible once death has re-
moved one party from the negotiating table. 
Professor John Langbein broadens this analysis to future 
interests generally, where it becomes “the anti-dead-hand prin-
ciple.”248 This principle “is fundamentally a change-of-
circumstances doctrine . . . . The living donor can always 
change his or her mind, as he or she observes the consequences 
of an unwise course of conduct, or as other circumstances 
change, but the . . . deceased . . . cannot.”249 The third Restate-
ment of Trusts reiterates: “the ‘rigor mortis’ of deadhand con-
trol is not present while a property owner is able to respond to 
persuasion and evolving circumstances.”250 
This argument holds a visceral appeal, but we must be 
careful to note its limits as a rationale for trammeling freedom 
of testation. The Restatement cites the rationale to justify the 
immediate invalidation of marital conditions within testamen-
 
 245. See supra text accompanying notes 98–99. 
 246. POSNER, supra note 98, § 18.7, at 548. 
 247. PERILLO, supra note 14, § 5.14. 
 248. John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1105, 1110 (2004). 
 249. Id. at 1111. And again: “One justification for reduced deference to the 
deceased transferor is that once in the grave, a decedent cannot reconsider a 
foolish course of conduct as its consequences emerge, or as circumstances 
change.” John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the 
Settlor’s Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 378 (2010).  
 250. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003). The second Re-
statement of Property had likewise observed: “Because of an inability to con-
sider changed circumstances, the law is less receptive to restraints imposed by 
the dead hand than to those imposed by the living.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. c (1983). For additional scholarly 
commentary in support of this rationale, see Chester, supra note 237, at 728 
(“[F]lexibility . . . would appeal to many dead settlers if they could be brought 
back to life.”); Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. 
REV. 611, 652–55 (1988). But cf. Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the 
Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1261–62 (1985) 
(suggesting that judicial powers to modify future interests would be subject to 
abuse); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 222, at 1331, 1340–41 (observing the 
uncertainty of, and the costliness to beneficiaries of, invoking a power of mod-
ification); supra note 183 (citing to peripherally relevant commentary). 
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tary trusts.251 Posner himself would intervene more frugally. 
He advocates only subsequent modification of marital condi-
tions.252 But under the Restatement, the mere fact that cir-
cumstances might change without the testator being able to re-
spond suffices to justify the condition’s nullification a priori—
even if circumstances never change, and the beneficiary simply 
prefers not to fulfill the condition. In this sense, the anti-dead-
hand principle as reflected in the Restatement is not solely “a 
change-of-circumstances doctrine.”253 
If the argument for this variant of the anti-dead-hand 
principle is the testator’s inaccessibility not merely to subse-
quent but also to immediate persuasion and reconsideration of 
the condition upon his or her death, the rationale would prove 
too much. On this basis, we could justify amending any estate 
plan that the testator declined to divulge to beneficiaries dur-
ing his or her lifetime. Once again, those beneficiaries will have 
had no opportunity to state their case for redividing the estate, 
and after the will comes to light in probate the testator can no 
longer “change his or her mind.”254 Such a doctrine would de-
stroy all but a remnant of freedom of testation, which no one is 
advocating. 
The only alternative is to abandon the anti-dead-hand 
principle as a rationale for the immediate invalidation of condi-
tions and fall back on the substantive public policy of the condi-
tions themselves for that purpose. The third Restatement of 
Trusts takes that analytical tack as well, as we have seen.255 
We took pains to address this aspect of the problem earlier in 
this Article.256 
At the same time, the anti-dead-hand principle gains plau-
sibility as a rationale for ex post modification of conditions and 
future interests as events unfold. Considering the problem in 
connection with marital conditions, Posner raises the possibili-
ty that “[a]s the deadline [for meeting the condition] ap-
proached, the [beneficiary] might come to the [testator] and 
persuade him that a diligent search had revealed no marriage-
 
 251. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmts. i, j (2003); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. c (1983).  
 252. See POSNER, supra note 98, § 18.7, at 548 (“This argues for applying 
the cy pres approach in private as well as charitable trust cases.”). On the cy 
pres doctrine, see supra text accompanying note 233. 
 253. See supra text accompanying note 249.  
 254. See supra text accompanying note 249. 
 255. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 256. See supra notes 73–87 and accompanying text. 
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able . . . girl [of the required faith] who would accept him. The 
father might be persuaded to . . . relax the condition”—a social 
process foreclosed by the testator’s demise.257 In other words, 
we can conceptualize the anti-dead-hand principle as an intent-
effectuating doctrine, carrying out revisions the court concludes 
a testator would have acceded to if only he or she were present 
to exercise his or her judgment.  
But here we arrive at the crux of the matter. The Uniform 
Trust Code styles its doctrine of trust modification as a manda-
tory rule.258 That formulation is inconsistent with the rationale 
that modifications are premised on a hypothetical change of 
heart.259 Yet, the issue is not quite so simple as that, for, 
though it purports to be mandatory, the Code’s doctrine of mod-
ification only covers “circumstances not anticipated by the set-
tlor.”260 If the trust expressly dictates that its terms should re-
main unchanged even in the event that stated contingencies 
occur, then those circumstances have been anticipated, and the 
doctrine fails to apply.261 But then when, if ever, is the doctrine 
mandatory? Only, it appears, when the trust expresses a gen-
eral prohibition on modification without anticipating specific 
contingencies.262 
 
 257. POSNER, supra note 98, § 18.7, at 528; see also id. § 18.3, at 544–45.  
 258. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 428 (2006). 
 259. Professor Langbein remarks the duality without criticism:  
In one dimension, these change-of-circumstance rules are intent-
serving. They are imputed-intent doctrines, which empower the court 
to modify the trust as the settlor would have wished had the settlor 
known of the changed circumstance. The dimension that requires 
these doctrines to be grouped with intent-defeating mandatory rules 
is that the settlor is forbidden to oust them. 
Langbein, supra note 248, at 1117. By comparison, the analogous rule elabo-
rated in the third Restatement of Trusts is not expressed as a mandatory doc-
trine, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmts. a–b (2003), although 
the Restatement proposes an additional rule not found in the Uniform Trust 
Code allowing the court to override a condition or restriction in the absence of 
changed circumstances. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
 260. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 507 (2006). “To 
the extent practicable, the modification must be made in accordance with the 
[testator’s] probable intention.” Id. 
 261. Thus, a testator “concerned about the possibility of an unwanted sec-
tion 412(a) modification . . . could attempt to avoid one by including in the 
terms of the trust a recitation of circumstances the settlor anticipated.” Alan 
Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose 
Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649, 665–66 (2005).  
 262. If changing circumstances transform a trust condition or restriction 
into one that contravenes public policy, then the court would again ignore a 
testamentary directive not to amend the trust. Langbein, supra note 248, at 
1118–19.  
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What could justify this sort of doctrinal distinction between 
the general and the specific? The Uniform Trust Code itself of-
fers no explanation, nor have commentators.263 Perhaps the 
drafters of the Code assume a testator is less resolute when ex-
pressing a general prohibition on modification. He or she may 
nevertheless have only certain eventualities in mind and would 
have been more amenable to changing his or her mind about 
not changing his or her mind if an unforeseen eventuality ma-
terializes. This argument suggests the possibility of a rule bar-
ring general prohibitions of modification operating beyond the 
near term, excepting from the scope of the bar expressions of 
intent regarding the foreseeable future. As it happens, that is 
how the Code’s closely related rule of cy pres is structured to 
operate.264  
Still, the issue has another side to it, as the contracts anal-
ogy reveals. Just as a testator might overlook a risk when set-
ting the terms of a future interest, so might contracting parties 
fail to take into account some improbable occurrence, rendering 
the contract economically irrational and “impractical” to per-
form. Under the doctrine of supervening frustration, echoing 
the modern doctrine of trust modification, a court can rewrite 
the terms of the contract.265 But the doctrine again relies on the 
inference, which the court must draw, that had the parties an-
ticipated the risk they would have worded the contract differ-
ently.266 Under the doctrine of assumption of risk, parties nev-
ertheless can bargain around frustration by explicitly, or even 
implicitly, overriding it under the terms of the contract.267 In 
this respect, “relief for impracticability or hardship does not in-
terfere with freedom of contract.”268  
If the same rationale underlies the doctrine of trust modifi-
cation, then the same conclusion follows. Insofar as a testator 
wishes—and lawmakers could require an express statement of 
intent—to assume the risk that circumstances will change in 
 
 263. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105 cmt., 412 cmt. (amended 2005), 7C 
U.L.A. 428, 507–08 (2006). 
 264. Under the Code, application of the cy pres doctrine becomes mandato-
ry only after twenty-one years have passed. Id. § 413(b)(2). 
 265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272 cmt. c (1981). 
 266. Id. (“Since it is the rationale of this [rule] that, in a case of impractica-
bility or frustration, the contract does not cover the case that has arisen, the 
court’s function . . . [is that of ] supplying a term to deal with that omitted 
case.”).  
 267. Id. §§ 261 cmt. c, 265; PERILLO, supra note 14, §§ 13.2, 13.16.  
 268. PERILLO, supra note 14, § 13.20, at 478. 
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ways that he or she cannot foresee, then the testator should 
have the same freedom to do so that a contracting party en-
joys.269 To do otherwise would defeat the testator’s considered 
intransigence,270 while exposing the intent-effectuating ration-
ale for modification as a fiction.271  
But even when a testator’s will is silent on the matter of 
modification, if our basis for it is the hypothesis that the testa-
tor might have had a change of heart, then we still must ask—
again by analogy to the doctrine of supervening frustration—
how likely such a change of heart would be. Under contracts 
doctrine, by comparison, assumption of particular risks may be 
implicit.272 Our answer hinges on the testator’s motive for sad-
dling a bequest with future conditions, or future use restric-
tions, or future distributive provisions. When moved by simple 
benevolence, a testator ought to incline toward a more plastic 
estate plan. Under conditions of interdependent utility “your 
gain is my gain,” so any revision that enhances beneficiaries’ 
eventual happiness should prospectively enhance the testator’s. 
Still, other considerations can inform future interests, and the 
manner in which a testator frames them can signal, or at least 
hint at, his or her willingness to alter their stipulations. 
Consider conduct and use restrictions of a moral or reli-
gious nature. These a testator may impose for selfish reasons, 
to express his or her own identity.273 Assuming so, we have 
 
 269. Posner raises this possibility but hedges. He advocates taking “the cy 
pres approach in private . . . trust cases unless, perhaps, the testator expressly 
rejects a power of judicial modification.” POSNER, supra note 98, § 18.7, at 548 
(emphasis added). 
 270. The danger remains that an assumption-of-risk clause could become 
boilerplate language in prolonged trusts and hence escape due consideration 
after all. That appears unlikely, however: estate planners are sensitive to the 
hazard of changed circumstances and routinely counsel clients to build flexibil-
ity into prolonged trusts. E.g., Harrison Gardner, Designing Wills and Trust 
Instruments to Provide Maximum Flexibility, 18 EST. PLAN. 138 passim (1991). 
By the same token, estate planners would likely counsel against assumption-
of-risk clauses. Fellows, supra note 250, at 655. The appearance in a will of 
such a clause “would suggest that a fairly sophisticated drafter had considered 
carefully the issue of flexibility in the dispository scheme.” Id. 
 271. See Paul G. Haskell, Justifying the Principle of Distributive Deviation 
in the Law of Trusts, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 267, 283–85, 291–92 (1967) (rejecting 
the intent-effectuating rationale on this basis but nonetheless defending a man-
datory power of judicial modification on the grounds that it “place[s] another 
reasonable limit upon the dispositive power” of testators, in the interest of “pro-
tecting individuals to whom the testator was responsible or felt responsible”). 
 272. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
 273. For a discussion of this element in the social psychology of testation, 
along with scholarly references, see Hirsch, supra note 142, at 52–56. In a re-
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every reason to anticipate the testator’s fixity of intent. Alter-
natively, a testator might insist on these restrictions out of pa-
ternalistic regard for beneficiaries, intending to inculcate in 
them values or beliefs that the testator deems salutary. Once 
again, in that event, we have little cause to predict a testator 
would answer a beneficiary’s appeals for removal of a restric-
tion, even if made in seemingly dire circumstances. After all, 
paternalists always act against the wishes of the paternalized 
party; they must not see to, but through all efforts to prevail 
upon them, while shutting their ears to cries of protest. In this 
regard, a paternalistic testator might even welcome the rigidity 
of dead-hand control as a bulwark against his or her own soft-
heartedness or vulnerability to persuasion.274 
The case differs with respect to restrictions on a benefi-
ciary’s consumption choices, or simply future allocations among 
beneficiaries. Here, apparently acting out of straightforward 
concern for beneficiaries’ welfare, a testator would have reason 
to accede to revisions if and when needs change down the road. 
Lawmakers therefore have greater cause to apply the anti-
dead-hand principle in these instances. 
In sum, a doctrine of trust modification premised on im-
puted intent should take into consideration inferences lawmak-
ers can draw as to the testator’s resoluteness and should also 
take the form of a default rule.275 Otherwise, such a doctrine 
 
cent case, the court reflected upon the testator’s reasons for imposing a reli-
gious marital restriction: 
The record . . . reveals that [the testator’s] intent in restricting the 
distribution of his estate was to benefit those descendants who opted 
to honor and further his commitment to Judaism by marrying within 
the faith. [The testator] had expressed his concern about the potential 
extinction of the Jewish people . . . by gradual dilution as a result of 
intermarriage with non-Jews. While he was willing to share his boun-
ty with a grandchild whose spouse converted to Judaism, this was 
apparently as far as he was willing to go.  
In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 896 (Ill. 2009). 
 274. The same concern may motivate some testators while alive to with-
hold the details of their estate plans from beneficiaries. See Robert Solomon, 
Helping Clients Deal with Some of the Emotional and Psychological Issues of 
Estate Planning, PROB. & PROP., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 56, 57–58 (discussing pref-
erences for secrecy).  
 275. In several recent cases, courts have denied petitions to modify the 
provisions of trusts on the basis of inferences concerning the settlor’s probable 
anticipation of the changed circumstance and inferences concerning the testa-
tor’s resolve. See Smith v. Hallum, 691 S.E.2d 848, 850 (Ga. 2010) (involving 
the changed circumstance of an attack by one deranged beneficiary on another 
beneficiary); In re Trust D Created Under the Last Will of Darby, 234 P.3d 
793, 801 (Kan. 2010) (addressing inflation as a changed circumstance); La-
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will clash for no apparent reason with its analogue in contract 
law. That lawmakers have allowed the paths of these laws 
nonetheless to diverge has a ready, and by now predictable, ex-
planation: neither the Uniform Trust Code nor the third Re-
statement of Trusts ever once cites to contract doctrines of mod-
ification by way of comparison.276 
Lawmakers still might premise a doctrine of modification 
on the costs future interests impose on beneficiaries, balanced 
against the benefits they bring testators.277 In reworking the 
doctrine along these lines, lawmakers would again need to bear 
in mind the importance that a condition or use restriction often 
holds for those testators who trouble themselves to impose one, 
together with the ex ante consequences of a rule operating po-
tentially to confound testamentary intent. Faced with a manda-
tory doctrine of modification, a single-minded testator might 
prefer to disinherit beneficiaries in favor of charity or simply to 
spend more wealth during his or her lifetime.278 A weighing of 
interests calls for freedom to impose a condition or a use re-
striction for some space of time postmortem; a mandatory pow-
er of modification should come into effect only after that time 
has elapsed.279  
 
dysmith Rescue Squad, Inc., v. Newlin, 694 S.E.2d 604, 608 (Va. 2010) (ad-
dressing disputation among beneficiaries as a changed circumstance).  
 276. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(4), 412–413 & cmts. (amended 2005), 
7C U.L.A. 428, 507–10 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 65–67 & 
cmts. (2003). 
 277. See supra notes 228–30, 271 and accompanying text; see also Hirsch & 
Wang, supra note 5, at 21, 50–51. One of the Restatement rules, which does 
not depend on changed circumstances, authorizes judicial modification if the 
court “determines that the reason(s) for . . . modification outweigh the materi-
al purpose.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2) (2003); see also supra 
note 239 and accompanying text. 
 278. Under current law, future interests out of trust escape the reach of the 
rules of modification found in the Uniform Trust Code and the third Restate-
ment of Trusts, so a settlor bent on imposing inflexible conditions or use re-
strictions could avoid the threat of modification by steering clear of trust law. 
Lawmakers, in turn, could foreclose this evasion by extending trust rules of 
modifications to future interests out of trust, but that might simply occasion 
further distortions of a settlor’s estate plan.  
 279. The Uniform Trust Code takes this approach with respect to its cy 
pres doctrine, which becomes mandatory after twenty-one years, but not with 
regard to the Code’s general doctrine of trust modification, which becomes 
mandatory immediately. Compare UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b)(2) (amended 
2005), 7C U.L.A. 509 (2006), with id. §§ 105(b)(4), 412(a). See supra text ac-
companying notes 236–38; see also Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 222, at 
1340 (offering a proposal for a mandatory general doctrine of trust modifica-
tion taking effect only “after the income beneficiaries alive at the creation of 
the trust are dead”).  
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  CONCLUSION   
This Article has advocated assimilating contracts and wills 
into a single genus of legal doctrine. Glimpsed from this van-
tage, existing rules of contracts and wills betray troubling in-
consistencies between parallel doctrines and, what is worse, 
contradictions at points of intersection where the rules some-
times operate at cross-purposes. Lawmakers need to confront 
these anomalies. To be sure, categorical fragmentation is not 
directly to blame for them and has not caused anomalies invar-
iably to appear. On occasion, lawmakers operating within sepa-
rate categories manage to arrive at comparable conclusions 
without coordinating their efforts.280 Nevertheless, fragmenta-
tion has tended to distract attention from the structural rela-
tionships and potential interplay of contracts and wills, thereby 
creating an environment in which anomalies could flourish. 
Categorical union would improve matters, again indirectly, by 
illuminating analogies and connections that the prevailing 
framework of categories obfuscates. 
The weight of scholarly opinion nowadays favors whittling 
down freedom of testation.281 Comparative analysis with free-
dom of contract suggests, on the contrary, extending liberty of 
will-making beyond even its existing, not inconsiderable, lati-
tude. To adopt the more fashionable course would further ag-
gravate the disharmony between freedom of testation and free-
dom of contract. Lawmakers could, of course, get to grips with 
the problem the other way around, by narrowing freedom of 
contract. Analysis mindful of the accepted grounds for invading 
liberty of transfer nevertheless counsels against pursuing that 
avenue to doctrinal consistency. 
It may be worth noting that any enlargement of freedom of 
testation would not occur against a background of anomie and 
should disturb established patterns of testation only slightly, if 
at all. Although individuals can follow idiosyncratic paths of 
will-making more easily than in other actions—for they do not 
have to suffer the social repercussions of this action282—most 
 
 280. See supra notes 53–54, 131–32 and accompanying text. 
 281. For a recent discussion, see MADOFF, supra note 32, at 154–56. The 
Uniform Trust Code and the third Restatement of Trusts both make moves in 
this direction. See supra notes 65, 235–39 and accompanying text. 
 282. For a statement of the relative freedom of testators from social con-
straints, see M. Meston, The Power of the Will, 27 JURID. REV. 172, 173 (1982). 
For further discussions, see Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent 
Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 639 (1989); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 13. 
For an early observation, see HOBHOUSE, supra note 228, at 94. Although so-
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wish to be remembered in a positive light.283 In the main, indi-
viduals follow prevalent norms when designing their estate 
plans.284 When deviations occur, they may even set new trends. 
The occasional “norm entrepreneur” has succeeded in trans-
forming testamentary convention over the course of American 
history.285  
If anything, this social reality suggests additional reasons 
for strengthening freedom of testation. On the one hand, we 
can predict that doing so will yield few more aberrant estate 
plans. And on the other hand, by so doing we set the stage for a 
kind of recurring moral triumph. If Auden was wrong,286 if 
freedom fulfilled constitutes a value in itself, then freedom self-
restrained offers even greater value, by presenting an abiding 
testament—in both senses of the word—to the better angels of 
our nature. 
 
cial disapproval could be accounted a “cost” of unorthodox testation—and thus 
potentially a spillover cost—it represents both an economically insignificant 
and philosophically controversial one. See supra notes 145–47 and accompany-
ing text.  
 283. For a discussion of this reputational component of testation, see 
Hirsch, supra note 142, at 53–55. 
 284. For a study, see T.P. Schwartz, Testamentary Behavior: Issues and 
Evidence About Individuality, Altruism and Social Influences, 34 SOC. Q. 337 
passim (1993).  
 285. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 30–32 (2000) (discussing 
the role of norm entrepreneurs within social norm theory). A leading example 
is Andrew Carnegie, whose testamentary preference for charity over children 
has influenced succeeding generations of Americans, in particular those whose 
wealth (like Carnegie’s) was “self-made.” Hirsch & Wang, supra note 5, at 44 
n.170. Thus Bill Gates, currently the wealthiest American, has pledged to give 
away ninety-five percent of his wealth to charity, asserting that he does not 
want to “burden[ ]” his children with his wealth, see Nadine Brozan, Chronicle, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1995, at B6, while the second-wealthiest American simi-
larly characterizes a sizeable inheritance as “debilitating” to one’s children. 
JANET LOWE, WARREN BUFFETT SPEAKS 47–48 (1997). These voices echo Car-
negie: “I would as soon leave my son a curse as the almighty dollar.” Andrew 
Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. AM. REV. 653, 658 (1889), reprinted in DEMOCRACY 
AND THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 4 (Gail Kennedy ed., 1949). In many other coun-
tries, no comparable tradition of filial disinheritance exists. See Charity Ends 
at Home, ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 39 (remarking the absence of such a 
norm in China); Seth Faison, Who’s Afraid of Wei Jingsheng?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 23, 1997, § 4, at 5 (same). But today’s American norm entrepreneurs are 
working on the Chinese, with mixed success. See Renee Haines, We’re More 
Likely to Give When We See How Easy It Is, CHINA DAILY (Beijing), Sept. 15, 
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 18290585 (remarking efforts by Gates and Buf-
fett to promote philanthropy in China); Michael Wines, In China, Attitudes on 
Generosity Are Tested, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, at A4 (same).  
 286. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
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Doubtless, some will question the conceptual realignment 
proposed in this Article. The larger point, though, is the impor-
tance of the quest. Although one of law’s oldest vineyards, the 
field of wills remains underdeveloped theoretically. Scholars 
have rarely tilled its soil with the implements of interdiscipli-
nary analysis that have proven so fruitful in other regions of 
the legal landscape.287 But that is not all: as this Article has 
ventured to show, intercategorical analysis can also cast a flood 
of light upon a field that heretofore has remained too insular. 
Toward this end, we must eschew specialization—a predisposi-
tion in most of law’s fields, indeed one that transcends legal 
studies288—in pursuit of eclecticism and, to the fullest extent 
possible, synthesis. 
In a word, inheritance scholars must learn to think outside 
the coffin. Only then can we revitalize a subject that presses so 
relentlessly upon the world and figures so eventfully in our 
lives. 
 
 287. Not so in the subfield of trusts, which—at least in part as a result—
has enjoyed a renaissance of late. For an observation, see Max M. Schanzenbach 
& Robert H. Sitkoff, The Prudent Investor Rule and Trust Asset Allocation: An 
Empirical Analysis, 35 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. J. 314, 314–15 (2010). 
 288. Specialization poses risks in science as well. See, e.g., P.B. MEDAWAR, 
THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE 70–72 (1984). 
